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ABSTRACT 
Within the Islamic world, the religious past often plays a formative role in our 
understanding of contemporary issues. One such rhetorical idiom from the past, the label 
“Kharijite,” has been, and is still, used as a pejorative by both state and non-state actors 
against myriad Islamist organizations and entities. Through an intensively researched 
description of historical, religious, and contemporary literature, this thesis examines the 
historical origins of the ancient Kharijite narrative and the manner in which the historical 
precedence of the term and its associated imagery have been applied to recent history. 
Research indicates that the Kharijite label has been used as and remains a legitimizing 
instrument with the power to imbue its user with Islamic credentials and authority while 
marginalizing opposition movements. As exemplified in post-colonial Egypt, states use 
the Kharijite epithet during periods of state formation or weak government rule to 
solidify the state’s monopoly of the use of violence within an Islamic context. Similarly, 
non-state actors use the charge to create political and religious legitimacy for their 
movement to the detriment of rival factions. This common utilization of the Kharijite 
epithet by both state and non-state actors demonstrates the political power of the 
Islamic lexicon and underscores the legitimacy crisis of nascent regimes and the 
potential risk for Western states that support regimes who employ the “Kharijite” 
epithet. 
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The past, particularly the religious past, often plays a formative role in our 
understanding of contemporary issues. The continuous reinvention of idioms, tradition, 
ritual, and institutions provide a heuristic frame in which modern-day events are 
understood. These well-sculpted and potent orthodoxies set the boundaries and rules in 
which actors—the state and non-state, religious and political—interact. They are part of 
the cultural toolkit that allows agents of history to selectively retrieve cultural symbols and 
religious tropes that are often manipulated to fit the mold of contemporary events. 
Moreover, the utilization of well-worn epithets and narratives not only mirrors the present 
environment but rather the identities and actions of those actors living within it. It is within 
this phenomenon that a society’s historical memory intersects with the context of the 
present; a blended reality emerges from such a crossroads, part religious orthodoxy, part 
historical narrative, part extant events. The construction of such a hybrid reality represents 
an attempt to shape the present by harnessing a fluid and selectively curated reality from 
the past. 
Within the Islamic cultural idiom, the labeling of someone or something 
“Kharijite”—the name of an early Islamic faction with a reputation for extreme violence 
and religious intransigence—is often wielded as a potent rhetorical weapon. State and non-
state actors brandish the Kharijite label and its associated narrative as a pejorative that 
imbues their existence and legitimacy with a religiously and polemically laden narrative 
well understood by the Islamic community. In the twentieth century, groups such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Takfir wal-Hijra, and the Islamic Group garnered the title of “neo-
Kharijites,” conjuring violent, fringe, and unequivocally religious imagery that is 
understood, in this recurrence, as an existential challenge to the modern state and fabric of 
Islamic society. In the twentieth century, the Islamic State and its affiliates have been the 
recipients of similar aspersions for their rebellious, destabilizing, and extremist behaviors; 
however, non-state actors such as Madkhali adherent Salafists in Libya, prominent 
Islamists within the Muslim Brotherhood, and leaders of the Islamic State have labeled 
rivals and internal dissidents as Kharijites in defense of their own legitimacy, exposing the 
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political dimension of the term’s use and the non-state actor’s agenda. The use of the term 
by seemingly antithetical entities makes its invocation even more peculiar and interesting. 
Not only is the Kharijite epithet used by state-actors from Morocco to Afghanistan, but 
simultaneously used by extremist groups who employ the moniker when branding other 
extremist groups as heretics.1 The use of the Kharijite curse by disparate actors indicates 
that each shares components of a collective, Islamic identity that not only represents a 
religious intent but a spectrum of diverse impulses. 
The use of the term Kharijite not only reveals the religious identity and intent of 
those using its power—state actors like Egypt and non-state actors like the Islamic State—
but uncovers the political character of those who employ such epithets. Hence, both state 
actors and non-state actors have masked their political motivations of the Kharijite 
aspersion behind a religious, ideological façade. Understanding how actors use this term 
allows for three key insights: the degree to which Middle Eastern states co-opt religious 
institutions and narratives to neutralize challenges from domestic and external threats; the 
degree to which the Islamist groups resolve challenges to their authority and constitution 
from internal and external threats; and the potential utility of the term’s employment in 
combating Islamist extremism. 
Furthermore, religious institutions associated with the states of Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, and Morocco have issued multiple religious decrees, labeling both violent and non-
violent domestic groups and transnational extremist organizations as Kharijites to 
demonize such groups and marginalize their power.2 While these religious decrees did not 
emanate from the state, the religious institution’s proximity to regime power indicates a 
co-opting of spiritual authority to advance the efforts of the state. It should be noted that 
states use multiple terms to demonize their rivals, including takfiris, terrorists, and 
mufsideen bil ard (corruptors on Earth.) This use of “official Islam” as an extension of 
 
1 Mohammed M. Hafez, “Not My Brother’s Keeper: Factional Infighting in Armed Islamist Movements,” Journal 
of Religion and Violence 7, no. 2 (2019): 189–208, https://doi.org/10.5840/jrv2019112265. 
2 Hussam S. Timani, Modern Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites (New York: Peter Lang Inc., International 
Academic Publishers, 2007); Jeffrey T. Kenney, Muslim Rebels: Kharijites and the Politics of Extremism in Egypt, 1 
edition (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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regime power elevates the state, placing it in a position of religiously ordained authority 
over any domestic or external challenge.  
This thesis seeks to understand why and when state and non-state actors utilize the 
term Kharijite when branding rebel, Islamist, or extremist groups. Moreover, it will 
investigate the historical, religious, and political implications associated with the term 
Kharijite. By understanding the Kharijite narrative’s ancient origins and factors 
surrounding its modern use, we can comprehend the phenomenon’s modern incantation 
and the intersection of religion, centralized power, and political dissension. More broadly, 
this thesis seeks to provide a deeper understanding of the idiom’s strategic significance in 
the communication of religious values, identity, and political motivations.  
A. DEFINITIONS AND FRAMING 
This thesis discusses the phenomenon of the Kharijites and the use of the term as a 
weapon or brand—specific to the context of Islamic society’s religious and cultural 
lexicon. From this need for specificity, it is important to define some of the terms used 
within this thesis. Culture is defined as “the shared system of meanings that we use to 
structure social life and guide our social interactions.”3 Culture and cultural identity are not 
static but exist in a consistently evolving state based on repeated social interactions and 
changing structural forces. A cultural idiom is a set of words or phrases that denote a 
specific concept or phenomenon within a given cultural group. Thus, the term Kharijite 
and the associated narrative belong to an Islamic cultural idiom, in which the term and its 
associated meaning and imagery are understood. As Serif Mardin notes: 
Every author who has written about Islam has indicated that Islam is more 
than simply a religious belief, that it structures the social life of Islamic 
societies, that it provides the foundations for political obligation and that, in 
short, it penetrates the smallest interstices of daily life and of social and 
political organization. What these authors have not elucidated is the process 
by which such a society is reproduced. What I suggest is that the 
 
3 Brian A. Monahan, The Shock of the News: Media Coverage and the Making of 9/11 (New York: NYU Press, 
2010), 31. 
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reproduction of Islamic societies is linked to a common use of an Islamic 
idiom by the members of such societies.4 
In this way, the Kharijite aspersion is a prime example of such an Islamic idiom; the epithet 
is cast in a pejorative manner, framing the cultural identity of the Kharijites as an Islamic 
folk devil. This devilish invocation evokes specific radical and dangerous imagery 
understood by most within Islamic society. The term is leveraged to define a person or 
group in absolute, unambiguous terms, with little intellectual room to refute or debate the 
accuracy of such a title.  
This thesis defines a state as “a human community that [successfully] claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”5 Throughout 
each chapter, references to Max Weber, the Weberian State, or Weber’s axiom regarding 
statehood refer to this definition. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
An examination of the historical Kharijites, modern Kharijites, and the use of the 
term Kharijite by state and non-state actors encompasses a review of five sets of literature: 
heresiographical and historical scholarship from the medieval Islamic period; modern Arab 
historiography; Kharijite apologetic scholarship; Islamic turath scholarship; and modern 
Western scholarship. To thoroughly answer the research questions, it is essential to have a 
deep understanding of the original Kharijites as seen through various lenses. This literature 
helps answer the primary research questions addressed in this thesis by providing numerous 
interpretations and conclusions regarding Western and non-Western perspectives of the 
original Kharijites, neo-Kharijites, and its use as a rhetorical term.  
For all literature written in Arabic, translations and cataloging were obtained 
through the dissertation and subsequent publications of Hussam Timani and other authors. 
 
4 Serif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), 3. 
5 Max Weber, Hans Heinrich Gerth, and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York; 
Oxon, Routledge Press, 2009), 78. 
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1. Medieval Islamic Scholarship 
The dominant view of the Kharijites emphasizes their extremist views of religion 
and piety, and above all, their violent tendencies and religious zealotry; these tones stem 
from narratives developed by proto-Sunni Muslim scholars in the generations following 
the first civil war.6 While historical evidence indicates that the Kharijites are indeed 
responsible for the discord and death attributed to their cause, Umayyad and Abbasid 
scholars authored polemics that minimized the political, social, and economic diversity of 
the Kharijite movement. Therefore, understanding the motivation and characterization of 
the Kharijites at the hands of the orthodox medieval ulema (Islamic scholars) provides the 
basis for the modern presentation of Kharijism in Western and non-Western circles alike. 
Several accounts of medieval Islamic literature focused on the historical, political, 
and theological progression of the Kharijites.7 Historians such as al-Tabari and Ibn 
Khayyat weave the emerging Sunni narrative into the historical instance of the Kharijites 
in a manner that promoted the centrality of Caliphal power and government order.8 The 
heresiographical writings—those concerned with sectarian branching of Islamic and non-
Islamic faiths—of al-Shahrastani, however, provide the most comprehensive review.9 Al-
Shahrastani’s extensive discussion of the Kharijites, his Kitab al-Milal wa al-Nihal (al-
Milal), is the most cited and well-developed account of the Kharijites. Key to our 
understanding of orthodox thought concerning the Kharijites, al-Milal encapsulates 
scholastic thought concerning the Kharijites from the seventh to eleventh centuries. 
A common refrain in al-Shahrastani’s writings on the Kharijites signals that he was 
overly concerned with the effects of dissention upon society.10 This can be seen in his 
 
6 Patricia Crone, God’s Rule—Government and Islam: Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2005), chap. 5. 
7 Al-Tabari, The History of Al-Tabari, Volume 17: The First Civil War: From the Battle of Siffin to the Death of 
‘ali A.D. 656–661/A.H. 36–40, trans. G. R. Hawting. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996; Robert 
G. Hoyland, ed., Khalifa Ibn Khayyat’s History on the Umayyad Dynasty, trans. Carl Wurtzel, 1st ed. Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2015; al-Shahrastani, Muslim Sects and Divisions, trans. A. K. Kazi, 1st ed. New York; 
Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2013. 
8 Timani, Modern Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites. 
9 al-Shahrastani, Muslim Sects and Divisions. 
10 al-Shahrastani, chap. 1. 
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definition of the Kharijites: “[W]hoever rebelled against the legitimate imam accepted by 
the people is called a [Kharijite] whether this rebellion took place at the time of the 
Companions [of the Prophet] against the rightfully guided imams, or their worthy 
successors, or against the imams of any time.”11 This definition places the Kharijites in a 
category of rebels who fight against any form of centralized government. Al-Shahrastani 
transforms the definition of the Kharijites from the specific designation of the seventh-
century group to any group that threatens a rightful (or appointed) leader. By defining the 
Kharijites in such terms, al-Shahrastani introduces the group as a religious symbol that 
“[A]nathematize [s] religious rebellion and upholds the status quo.”12 Al-Milal is not an 
instance-based polemic against the Kharijites akin to the works of earlier scholars; it 
entrenches and expands the Islamic understanding of the Kharijites as the persistent 
attempts of evil to incite dissent and discord among the righteous people of God.13 By 
doing so, al-Shahrastani attaches a universal and transcendent attribute of the “harmful 
effects of human dissension” to the group and the idiom of the Kharijites.14  
By invoking Mohammed’s warnings about the Kharijites and including the 
innovations of the Kharijites, al-Shahrastani synthesizes critical hadith with heresy. Not 
only did al-Shahrastani translate the concept of Kharijism into a universal and timeless 
movement, but he also sought to ground the original instance of Kharijism in the traditional 
Islamic texts.15 According to Al-Milal, the Prophet foretold of the coming of the Kharijites: 
“From the stock of this man there will emerge a people who will fly from religion as an 
arrow flies from a bow.”16 As stated in the Sunnah, Mohammad predicted the arrival of 
the Kharijites and their rebellious violence and heresy. Al-Shahrastani builds on 
Mohammad’s insights by enumerating the bida’—religious innovations that depart from 
 
11 al-Shahrastani, 85. 
12 Kenney, Muslim Rebels, 15. 
13 al-Shahrastani, Muslim Sects and Divisions. 
14 Jeffrey T. Kenney, The Emergence of the Khawarij: Religion and the Social Order in Early Islam (University 
of California, Santa Barbara, 1990), 3. 
15 Jeffrey T. Kenney, Heterodoxy and Culture: The Legacy of the Khawarij in Islamic History (University of 
Michigan Dissertation Information Service,1991); al-Shahrastani, Muslim Sects and Divisions. 
16 al-Shahrastani, Muslim Sects and Divisions, 100. 
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the proper practice of Islam—and proclaiming that the Khawarij were guilty of “the 
innovation of the imamate and the innovation of finding fault with Ali for his [arbitration] 
at Siffin.”17 This potent formula attaches a significant and negative religious association 
to not only the Kharijites but those deemed Kharijite like rebels. 
Correspondingly, Al-Shahrastani used his classification of the Kharijites as 
immortal rebels to defend the Caliphate, marking the Kharijites as a recurrent manifestation 
of evil and heretical, devious belief. He promotes Ali’s response to the Kharijite’s anti-
establishment themes: “[The Kharijites] say there is no need for government, yet there must 
be a government, either good or bad.”18 This elevates the idea that maintenance of the 
government, even in instances of derelict, corrupt, and immoral leadership, is supreme to 
challenges against it. Shahrastani’s statement thus enshrines the power and legitimation of 
the caliph (and future leadership) against any challenges to its authority. 
Al-Shahrastani’s definition and subsequent qualification of the Kharijites presented 
a liturgical yet politically vested rebuke of the group. Al-Milal serves as the consolidated 
Umayyad and Abbasid polemicist: it portrays the Kharijites as a challenge to the orthodox 
religious order, a threat to the Caliphate, and a danger to the Islamic community. 
2. Modern Arab Literature 
Modern Middle Eastern literature concerning the rise and propagation of Kharijite 
ideology focuses on the religious, political, and social motivations of the group and its 
struggle against centralized power in a more sympathetic manner. It must be noted that this 
literature emerged during a unique context in the modern Middle East, where the 
competing ideologies of Islamist and state-supported secular movements loom large in 
historical accounts of the Kharijites.19 Much of the literature of this period reflected 
contemporary interpretations of the struggle of secular-minded state authority and the place 
 
17 al-Shahrastani, 83. 
18 al-Shahrastani, 101. 
19 Timani, Modern Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites, 92. 
8 
of the Islamist movement within society. Thus, scholars offer their interpretations of the 
Kharijites to justify their views of the greater tensions in the Middle East.20  
Modern Arab scholars highlight the extreme religio-political position of the 
Kharijites concerning the power and authority of the four rightly guided Caliphs, the 
Umayyads, and the Abbasids. In his 1953 Tarikh al-Islam, Hasan Ibrahim Hasan argues 
that the Kharijites were no more than a political party that became increasingly 
disenchanted with the perceived corruption of the ruling elite.21 In Al-Islam wa Usul al-
Hukm, ‘Ali’ Abd al-Raziq argues that the Kharijites posed a significant threat to the unified 
Islamic community and the political structure of the Caliphate.22 Al-Raziq contests the 
notion that Arabs fought the Kharijites because they deviated from mainstream Islam, but 
rather waged wars “aimed at oppressing the group politically rather than defending Islam 
against ‘unbelievers.’”23 Echoing the sentiments of al-Raziq, Faruq’ Umar Fawzi in 
Nash’at al-Harakat al-Diniyya al-Siyasiyya fi al-Islam attributes the tension between the 
Caliphate and the Kharijites as one of central authority versus a rogue element that eschews 
centralized, dynastic rule in favor of a more individualistic and democratic order.24 Evident 
in this set of literature is the focus on the Kharijites’ political nature and their struggle 
against the centralized authority of the Caliphate. The re-emergence of Kharijite literature 
during the second half of the twentieth century was intended to overlay the current 
struggles of Islamists vis-à-vis the state.25 Therefore, the condition of the Kharijites, and 
thus the neo-Kharijites, is not one of pure religious struggle, but of political struggle. 
 
20 Timani, 92. 
21 Hasan Ibrahim Hasan, Tarikh al-Islam: al-siyasi wa-al-dini wa-al-thaqafi wa-al-ijtima`i (Sharjah: al-Dar al-
Andalus, 1964); cited in Timani, Modern Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites, 24–25. 
22 ‘Ali ‘Abd Al-Raziq, Al-Islam Wa Usul Al-Hukm: A Modern, Liberal Development of Muslim Thought, trans. 
Souad Tagelsir Ali Salt Lake City: Department of Languages and Literature, University of Utah Press, 2004; cited in 
Timani, Modern Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites, 35. 
23 ‘Ali ‘Abd Al-Raziq, ‘Ali ‘Abd Al-Raziq’s Al-Islam Wa Usul Al-Hukm, 194. 
24 Faruq’ Umar Fawzi, Nashat Al-Harakat al-Diniyah al-Siyasiyah Fi al-Islam, 1st ed. (Amman, Jordan: al-
Ahlīyah lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzī, 1999); cited in Timani, Modern Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites, 37. 
25 Timani, Modern Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites, 94–95. 
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3. Kharijite Apologetic Literature 
Much of the modern Islamic intellectual literature concerning the Kharijites comes 
from Ibadi scholars seeking to provide a more positive image of the Kharijites to separate 
the Ibadiyya from neo-Kharijism. This literature attempts to fully articulate the beliefs of 
the Ibadiyya, drawing distinctions between the Ibadiyya and the violent and extremist 
practices of the Kharijites. This literature, in conjunction with the Turath literature, has 
tried to counter the relatively negative image of the Kharijites with a more nuanced and 
polished view of the group.  
Sulayman ibn Dawud ibn Yusuf, in Al-Khawarij hum Ansar al-Imam ‘Ali, attempts 
to reconcile the Kharijite movement (and, in turn, the Ibadiyya) with that of mainstream 
Islam. Ibn Yusuf contends that the Kharijites were some of Caliph’ Ali’s most loyal 
followers and notes that heresiographers, like al-Shahrastani, intentionally distorted the 
image of the Kharijites.26 Shahrastani, in Ibn Yusuf’s view, was writing with centralized 
authority in mind and failed to provide evidence (isnad) for his assertions.27 Ibn Yusuf is 
not alone in assessing the treatment of Kharijites in the Islamic heritage as distorted by 
medieval Islamic scholars seeking to legitimate the powers of the state; this view is 
prevalent among Ibadi scholars and Western ideologues from around the Muslim world. 
4. Kharijites in the Turath  
According to Fazlur Rahman, “something of [the Kharijite’s] radical spirit…has 
been relived…in several relatively recent movements.”28 Four notable scholars of Islamic 
heritage interpret the Kharijites in the light of the scholars’ ideological predisposition—
Nationalist, Marxist, Feminist, and Islamist—and present modern takes on the Kharijites 
that further contorts the group’s original understanding to fit contemporary agendas. 
Ahmad Amin emphasizes the Arab Nationalist tone of the Kharijites, noting that 
 
26 Sulayman b. Dawud b. Yusuf, Al-Khawarij Hum Ansar al-Imam, 1st ed. (Qissnatina, Algeria: Dar al-Ba’th, 
1983), 16; Timani, Modern Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites, 79. 
27 Timani, Modern Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites. 
28 Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 170; Timani, Modern 
Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites, 77. 
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nationalism is not only a contemporary strain but rather a classical motif of Kharijite 
political doctrine that aimed to preserve the distinctly Arab identity of Islam.29 Hussein 
Mruwah and later R. E. Brunnow demonstrate the egalitarian and socialist-type behaviors 
of the Kharijites rooted in class conflict between the primarily tribal, nomadic Arabs, and 
the landed Arab elites that settled newly conquered lands in Syria and Iraq.30 The wealth 
obtained by the Umayyad, Quraysh, and other families at the expense of the proto-
Kharijites marginalized the group to an economic and political rebellion. Leila Ahmed 
places the egalitarian nature of the Kharijites next to her theories of Islamic feminism and 
argues that the practices and regulations placed on women by Muhammed were temporary 
and did not constrain the Kharijites.31 In allowing women to author poetry, fight, and have 
a say in the choice of leadership, Kharijite social thought was far more liberal than earlier 
depictions of the group. However, most importantly, the Islamist views of Mahmud Isma’il 
present the rise of the modern Islamist movement in terms of a Kharijite renaissance of 
religious purity and fundamentalism.32 While Isma’il intends to repaint the Kharijites in a 
positive, purist light that attempts to uplift modern Islamists, his work does little to 
challenge the widely held orthodox opinions of the Kharijites.  
5. Western Scholarship 
Western scholarship regarding the Kharijites ranges from the Orientalist writings 
of R. E. Brunnow and Julius Wellhausen in the latter part of the nineteenth century to the 
socio-political analysis of the Kharijites presented by Jeffrey Kenney.33 Early writings of 
the Kharijites in the West tend to focus on their religious and Bedouin-Arab origins, 
focusing on a purist and historical approach grounded in heresiographical Sunni polemics. 
 
29 Timani, Modern Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites, 93–94. 
30 Rudolf-Ernst Brünnow, “Die Charidschiten unter den ersten Omayyaden. Ein beitrag zur geschichte des ersten 
islamischen jahrhunderts ...” (Lieden: Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1884); Timani, Modern Intellectual Readings of the 
Kharijites, 49–50. Both scholars are referenced in Timani. Mruwah’s original work is in Arabic and Brunnow’s 
original work is in German. 
31 Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, Reissue edition. New 
Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1993.  
32 Timani, Modern Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites, 94–95. 
33 Julius Wellhausen, Religio-Political Factions in Early Islam (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co., 1975); 
Timani, Modern Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites, 49–55; Kenney, Muslim Rebels. 
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However, modern Western literature focuses on the political nature of the Kharijites and 
their struggles against the emerging political structure of the era. At its culmination lays 
Jeffrey Kenney’s Muslim Rebels: Kharijites and the Politics of Extremism in Egypt, 
Hussam Timani’s Modern Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites, and Hanna Lenna 
Hagemann’s “History and Memory: Khārijism in Early Islamic Historiography.”34 
In Muslim Rebels, Kenney analyzes the historical and political nature of the 
Kharijite epithet in Modern Egypt concerning the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots 
Takfir wal-Hijra and the Islamic Group.35 In essence, Kenney makes a case that state 
forces, in conjunction with the arbiters of “official Islam” at al-Azhar, revived “discursive 
references to the Kharijites…as a way to denounce” the rise of Islamist organizations that 
threatened the state’s authority.36 The touchstone of Kenney’s work points out the power 
of al-Azhar and the state to brand Islamist groups—whether violent or not—as a “demonic 
force rooted in the original activities of Satan and his ongoing efforts to bring about the 
downfall of humankind.”37 Therefore, modern Islamist groups are neo-Kharijites; tying 
the Brotherhood to the consistent embodiment of evil rather than the ephemeral religio-
political movement of the original group. Kenney then traces the evolution of Kharijite 
imagery and conception throughout the twentieth century from the era of Nasser to the 
present day. 
Timani, building on the heresiographical writings of medieval Islamic scholars, 
modern Middle Eastern, Kharijite apologists, and Modern Western scholarship, analyzes 
the rise of the group Takfir wal-Hijra and other Islamic extremist groups.38 He argues that 
“Islamic extremism is not a twentieth-century phenomenon…[but] first appeared with the 
Kharijites in the seventh century,” noting that certain “behaviors and terminologies of 
 
34 Kenney, Muslim Rebels; Timani, Modern Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites; Hannah-Lena Hagemann, 
“History and Memory: Khārijism in Early Islamic Historiography,” July 2, 2015, 
https://era.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/11692. 
35 Kenney, Muslim Rebels. 
36 Kenney, 24. 
37 Kenney, 21. 
38 Timani, Modern Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites. 
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contemporary extremist groups…can be traced to the Kharijite movement.”39 He contends 
that because of the Islamic extremist group’s behavioral overlap with the Kharijites 
concerning takfir (ex-communication), hijra (emigration), and hakimiyya (the sovereignty 
of God), the construing of ancient religious narratives with modern Islamist groups 
exhibiting similar behaviors is an easy comparison to make.40 Timani concludes that the 
rise of modern Islamic fundamentalism has resulted in “modern scholarship [giving] more 
attention to the study of Kharijites,” thus uncovering a broader and less Sunni orthodox 
understanding of the group.41 While the image of the Kharijites is not universally positive 
among Muslims and scholars, the group “serve [s] as a symbol…for many…as ideal 
Muslims,” egalitarians, bearers of democracy, and “tolerant in their treatment of 
women.”42 Conversely, Timani states that the Sunni orthodoxy of “official Islam” has 
perpetuated a negative image of the Kharijites, thus conflating the rise of a contemporary, 
fundamentalist movement—whose emergence is fourteen centuries removed from that of 
the Kharijites—and that of the original dissenters.  
Hanna Lenna Hagemann, in her PhD dissertation, argues that the collection of early 
historiographic writings concerning the Kharijites lack a narrative substance, indicating 
that the “historiographical sources approach Kharijism not as an end in itself, but as a 
narrative tool with which to illustrate, discuss, and criticize other actors and subject 
matters.”43 Hagemann takes a minimalist, if not pessimistic, view of the historiographers 
of Islamic antiquity. She notes that while the narratives are not likely a complete 
fabrications of the early Islamic years, “There is no getting past the acknowledgment that 
whatever historical ‘truth’ has survived in the sources is woven into … the complex 
construct of literary and rhetorical elements many of whose subtleties and double entendre 
had already been lost to the passage of time when the reports finally found their way into 
 
39 Timani, 104. 
40 Timani, chap. 4. 
41 Timani, 105. 
42 Timani, 116. 
43 Hagemann, “History and Memory,” 3. 
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the works of al-Baladhuri and his fellow historiographers.”44 Thus, accepting the historical 
narratives of the early heresiographers must be viewed in the light of the underlying 
compulsions and competing interests of their time. Hageman argues that the true identity 
and complaints of the Kharijites cannot be elucidated from the works of the 
historiographers; rather, historiographers were inclined to promote a particular topos as 
opposed to documenting events as they occurred.45 
The existing literature regarding the Kharijites has evolved from the early centuries 
of Islam to the emergence of Islamic extremist groups, as “they represent a resurgence of 
the past in the present.”46 While the literature presented here spans almost a millennium, 
it represents the thread that connects the original Kharijite movement to the modern Islamic 
extremists as “Kharijites.” The understanding of these conflicting modern narratives by a 
host of actors—states, non-state actors, and external state actors such as the United States—
lend themselves to natural tension between what clerical authority holds as the official 
image of the Kharijites and alternate perceptions of their identity. Therefore, the arc of their 
existence in scholarship and liturgical literature provides ample evidence and a starting 
point in answering the primary research questions of this thesis. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will explore the historiographical and heresiographical underpinnings 
of the Kharijite master narrative: Egypt from 1952 to the present; the Islamic State, al-
Qaeda, and al-Nusra from 2010 to the present; and a thick description of the use of the 
Kharijite narrative in all periods. Research presented thus far reveals that the use of the 
curse Kharijite occurs under conditions when a state is in its formative years or most 
vulnerable to both domestic and foreign threats. Under these conditions, states deem 
domestic and external Islamist and Islamic extremists pejoratively as Kharijites based on 
the themes of medieval scholarship, mainly that of al-Shahrastani, to link any group 
deemed a threat to the essentialist and deleterious Kharijites of antiquity. By providing a 
 
44 Hagemann, 192. 
45 Hagemann, 52. 
46 Timani, Modern Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites, 5. 
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fulsome description of the historical Kharijites, the popular perceptions of the Kharijites, 
and the political and religious disposition of the regimes that employ the term, 
policymakers, military operators, and U.S. interlocutors gain a richer understanding of the 
political and religious motivations behind the term’s use and the modern relationship 
between state power and the curse. 
Before proceeding to two case studies, this thesis will conduct a thorough 
examination of the Islamic heresiography and historiography concerning the Kharijites, as 
well as contemporary literature on the same subject. The establishment of a common 
historical narrative in the second chapter will form the foundation from which the 
contemporary interrogation of the use of the Kharijite narrative in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries is based.  
The primary method for analyzing why and when state and non-state actors use the 
term Kharijite in modern times centers on the historical examination of two case studies. 
The first case study will concern the use of the term Kharijite by the Egyptian government 
against the domestic group Muslim Brotherhood and Takfir wal-Hijra. The second case 
study will evaluate the use of the term Kharijite Islamists—members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and al-Nusra. By underscoring the perceptions 
of the Kharijites in theoretical, historical, and ideological literature combined with the 
historical background into each of the cases, a deeper understanding of the term’s use, 
desired effect by the user, the actual outcome of its use, and the term’s effectiveness can 
be assessed. In each case study, an assessment of the origin, medium of conveyance, the 
target of the term, and the intended audience will occur. Subsequently, conclusions can 
then be drawn regarding the reasons for the use of the term, the result of its use, and an 
assessment of its future efficacy. 
Concerning this thesis topic, little statistical data—polling, records, census 
results—is available. An evaluation of qualitative data—interviews, periodicals, reports, 
and existing literature—yielded the most robust assessment of the phenomenon. In the 
Egyptian case study, existing scholarship, religious archives, and available media archives 
were used. In the case of the Islamic State, social media and group-generated official media 
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(ex. Dabiq magazine in the case of the Islamic State) served as the primary resources 
interspersed with periodicals and existing scholarship.  
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This examination of the use of the term Kharijite by state and non-state actors will 
be divided into five chapters. Chapter I covers an introduction to the topic, as well as a 
literature review and thesis design. Chapter II will introduce the narrative of the Kharijites 
penned by medieval Islamic heresiographers and historiographers, providing the basis for 
the use of the term as a curse in the case studies reviewed. Chapter III will address the use 
of the term Kharijite by state forces—Egypt—and Chapter IV the use of the term by non-
state actors—the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic State, and al-Qaeda. Chapter V consists 
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II. THE MASTER KHARIJITE NARRATIVE47 
The contemporary narrative of the Kharijites in both Western and non-Western 
literature is inextricably influenced by the historiographers and heresiographers of the 
medieval Islamic period, roughly the ninth to thirteenth centuries. The histories produced 
by al-Tabari and Ibn Khayyat and the chronicles of heresy by al-Shahrastani paint a 
common image of the Kharijites as a violent, intransigent, and extremist group whose 
doctrine and behavior were formulated solely on the basis of religion. Moreover, it has 
been argued by many Western academics that Islamic scholars of the medieval age were 
not passive recorders of history and religion, but rather were motivated by ulterior political 
compulsions that sought to legitimize the power of Islamic orthodoxy in the hands of the 
newly formed Abbasid Caliphate and the rising institution of the ulema.48 The drive to 
consolidate and legitimize the rule of the newly established government and its religious 
arbiters, coupled with the purportedly heretical and heterodox tendencies of the Kharijites 
made the group an ideal target for the polemicist’s pen. By drawing on the events of the 
first centuries of Islam and Islamic scriptures (the Quran and Hadith), the ulema developed 
a malignant narrative of the Kharijites that fit the political, religious, and social needs of 
the ruling elite and cast the group as intrinsically poisonous to the wellbeing of the Muslim 
community. Thus, the identity of the Kharijites is both externally generated and based, in 
some part, on the subjective observations of the ulema. An understanding of the polemical 
narrative created and promulgated by the medieval Islamic heresiographers and 
historiographers provides the language by which the Kharijites are understood in the 
popular Islamic cultural dialect and is critical in explaining the emergence of the term’s 
utilization as a brand or curse in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
 
47 The phrase and overall composition of the master Kharijite narrative was fully elucidated by Rodney L. 
Thomson in his postgraduate thesis at California State University, Chico—“The Khawarij and Religious Identity 
Formation in Early Islam.” This thesis draws on themes and the history of Thomson’s second chapter. 
48 Timani, Modern Intellectual Readings of the Kharijites; Hagemann, “History and Memory”; Kenney, 
Heterodoxy and Culture. 
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The standard narrative of the Kharijites—in this study referred to as the master 
narrative49—is an amalgamation of oral and written sources compiled by early Islamic 
historiographers and heresiographers. To fully understand its importance, two main points 
must be noted about the early Islamic heresiographical and historiographical traditions 
before proceeding. First, Islamic historiographers of late antiquity attempted to document 
events as they occurred but did so within the emerging orthodoxy of the time and in a 
pattern of consistent polemical topoi.50 While this trait is common among most historians, 
an understanding of the political and religious context in which the scholars compiled 
Islamic history indicates their political impetus and orthodox tendencies. Secondly, the 
lack of reliable Kharijite primary sources—Kharijite poetry, coinage, and surviving 
religious texts—leaves the interpretation of Kharijite identity to Islamic and Western 
scholars with little substantial knowledge of the group.51 Thus, Kharijite identity, belief, 
and history are exogenous construction of medieval Islamic scholars who had little 
understanding of Kharijite self-identity or self-perceptions.  
This narrative of the Kharijites was distilled by using Islamic heresiographic and 
historiographic writing in conjunction with Western scholarship. Before proceeding with 
the narrative, it is crucial to note that the Kharijites were not a monolith; in doctrine, action, 
and fervor, no Kharijite sect was the same as the other. Many Kharijites, such as the 
Ibadiyya and Suffriyya, established, maintained, and expanded states in Arabia, Persia, and 
North Africa.52 However, the polemical narratives used in this chapter and the popular 
understanding of the Kharijites within Islam simplify the various sects and divisions of the 
 
49 Rodney L. Thomson, “The Khawarij and Religious Identity Formation in Early Islam” (Master’s thesis, Chico, 
CA: California State University, 2017), chap. 2. 
50 Hagemann, “History and Memory”; Rodney L. Thomson, “The Khawarij and Religious Identity Formation in 
Early Islam,” 12. 
51 For references on Kharijite primary sources, see A. Flayyeh and A. Al-Salehi, “Al-Shurat Picture in the 
Kharijite Poetry” 35 (January 1, 2008): 569–78; Adam R. Gaiser, “What Do We Learn About the Early Khārijites and 
Ibāḍiyya from Their Coins?,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 130, no. 2 (2010): 167–87. 
52 Paul M. Love Jr, “The Sufris of Sijilmasa: Toward a History of the Midrarids,” The Journal of North African 
Studies 15, no. 2 (June 1, 2010): 173–88, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629380902734136; Elizabeth Savage, A Gateway to 
Hell, a Gateway to Paradise: The North African Response to the Arab Conquest, First Edition (Princeton, NJ: Darwin 
Pr, 1997); Ballandalus, “Kharijism in Islamic North Africa (700-900): A Summary Overview,” Ballandalus (blog), 
August 12, 2014, https://ballandalus.wordpress.com/2014/08/12/kharijism-in-islamic-north-africa-700-900-a-summary-
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Kharijites into a homogenous group of actors. What all of the Kharijites did share was an 
intense dissatisfaction with the Caliphate and its emerging monarchical tendencies. This 
belief, seemingly common to all Kharijites, posed a clear danger to the Umayyad and 
Abbasid caliphates and their religious interlocutors, the ulema.  
A. MOHAMMAD AND THE FIRST KHARIJITE 
In the year 630,53 the Prophet Muhammed—after securing Mecca in the Battle of 
Hunayn—moved to unite the tribes of the Hijaz and Najd.54 As a result of that battle and 
the defeat of the tribes of Hawazin and Thaqif, the wealth of the Islamic community was 
overflowing.55 According to Islamic custom, the Prophet Muhammed divided the booty 
among his companions and warriors. However, some of Muhammed’s allies felt that their 
portion of the spoils of battle was inadequate and protested to Muhammed. One individual, 
Dhu al-Khuwaysirah of the Banu Tamim, denounced Muhammad as unjust in front of a 
handful of followers.56 Rather than mollify al-Khuwaysirah, Muhammed foretold that the 
disgruntled companion would one day lead a religion (understood as sect) that would prove 
ephemeral and leave little impact on the world: 
Let him alone, for he will have a following that will go so deeply into 
religion that they will come out of it as an arrow comes out of the target; 
you look at the head and there is nothing on it; you look at the butt end and 
there is nothing on it; then at the notch and there is nothing on it. It went 
through before flesh and blood could adhere to it.57 
As is the case with all the Prophet’s sayings, this prophecy would come to pass when al-
Khuwaysirah—also known by the name Hurqus ibn Zuhayr—would become the first 
Kharijite.58 Additionally, as detailed by al-Shahrastani, the Prophet was said to have 
 
53 All dates are in C.E.  
54 Maʿmar ibn Rāshid and M. A. S. Abdel Haleem, The Expeditions: An Early Biography of Muḥammad, trans. 
Sean W. Anthony, Bilingual edition (New York; London: NYU Press, 2014), 104–9. 
55 Al-Tabari, The History of Al-Tabari, Volume 9: The Last Years of the Prophet. Albany, NY: State University 
of New York Press 2019, 26–38. 
56 Al-Tabari, 26–38. 
57 I. Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad, trans. A. Guillaume, Reprint edition (Karachi; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 595–96. 
58 al-Shahrastani, Muslim Sects and Divisions, 99–100. 
20 
characterized the group as an extant fixture of society only to be remedied near the day of 
judgment.59 
B. THE BATTLE OF SIFFIN: THE SECESSION OF THE QURRA’ 
Though the episode of al-Khuwaysirah demonstrates Muhammed’s prescience in 
divining the first sectarians of Islam, the sect emerged in a recognizable form under the 
rule of the third Caliph, Uthman ibn ʻAffan, from a group initially termed the Qurra’.60 
The Qurra’ were considered pious men and earned their name from their practice of reciting 
the Qur’an from memory.61 The origins of the group are disputed; some argue their 
foundation is based on displeasure with caliphal authority as a consequence of the unequal 
division of war spoils, while other scholars like R. E. Brunnow contend the group was 
preoccupied with pre-Islamic tribal tradition and the ascendancy of the Banu Hashim over 
all other tribes.62 Upon the ascension of ‘Ali, the cousin and brother-in-law to the Prophet, 
to the position of commander of the faithful and fourth Caliph, a power struggle ensued 
between the newly minted Caliph and the powerful governor of Syria from the Banu 
Umayya, Muʻawiya ibn ‘Abi Sufyan. ‘Ali did not move against the murderers of former 
caliph Uthman, Muʻawiya’s cousin; thus, Muʻawiya refused to recognize ‘Ali as Caliph. 
The ensuing power struggle—known as the first civil war or fitna—culminated in the Battle 
of Siffin in 657. After several days of fierce and pitched fighting, the tide of the battle had 
swung decidedly in ‘Ali’s favor. However, not to be undone by the might of ‘Ali, 
Muʻawiya’s counselors, ‘Amr ibn al-ʻAs, advised Muʻawiya of a ploy to prolong the loss 
of the battle.63 At the end of their pikes, the soldiers of Muʻawiya raised the masahif—all 
or parts of the Quran—in an attempt to push ‘Ali to accept an arbitration based on the 
Quran. ‘Ali, fearing duplicity in Muʻawiya’s stunt and against his better judgment, 
conceded to arbitration at the behest of the Qurra’. The Qurra’ implored ‘Ali, “[R]espond 
 
59 Kenney, Muslim Rebels, 31. 
60 Al-Tabari, The History of Al-Tabari Vol. 17. 
61 G. H. A. Juynboll, “The Qurrā’ in Early Islamic History,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the 
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to the Book of God when you are called to it…Otherwise we shall indeed deliver you up 
entirely to the enemy or do what we [did] with [Uthman].”64 Accepting arbitration proved 
disastrous for ‘Ali. ‘Ali’s chosen arbitrator and that demanded by the Qurra’, Abu Musa 
al-Ashʻari, was neither as cunning nor intellectual as ‘Amr ibn al-ʻAs, Muʻawiya’s 
arbitrator.65 Outwitted by the cunning al-As, both Muʻawiya and ‘Ali agreed to abandon 
their claims to the Caliphate and left the decision of the new commander of the faithful to 
a council.66  
‘Ali, struck by the deception of Muʻawiya and al-As, was reluctant, however, to 
accept the results of the arbitration as he had effectively been on the brink of victory prior 
to arbitration. Experiencing a shift in opinion that disavowed their previous calls for 
arbitration, the Qurra’ now called for the resumption of battle; arbitration had effectively 
subsumed God’s will below that of man’s.67 This action, in due course, was a grave sin to 
the Qurra’ who openly called for ‘Ali to eschew arbitration, chanting “judgment belongs 
to God alone.” ‘Ali refused the demands of the Qurra’, further deepening the tension within 
‘Ali’s camp. The Qurra’, now disenchanted with ‘Ali, who placed the judgment of a man 
before God, seceded from ‘Ali’s camp and sought refuge in the village of Harura near 
Kufa.68 There, the proto-Kharijites elected ʻAbdallah ibn Wahb al-Rasibi as their faction’s 
leader, one who was capable of “commanding the good and the prohibiting of what is 
reprehensible.”69 The group of seceders, sometimes called the Harura for the place in 
which they gathered, were joined by other like-minded Muslims from Kufa and Basrah.  
Displeased with the arbitration and plagued by bands of Kharijites murdering others 
for their beliefs, ‘Ali set out to raise an army in what is now Kufa and Basrah.70  After 
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cobbling together a force, ‘Ali was determined to attack the seceders first, followed by 
Muʻawiya and his Syrian brethren. The seceders, now encamped at al-Nahrawan, met ‘Ali 
on the field of battle in 658.71 The result was a decisive victory for ‘Ali, who left only ten 
surviving Kharijites; among the dead was the first Kharijite proclaimed by the Prophet: 
Dhu al-Khuwaysirah. Those Kharijites surviving the battle escaped to Khorasan, the Najd, 
Oman, and North Africa, and would win converts in their new homes.72 While the battle 
of Nahrawan did not mark the end of the Kharijites, it marked the last instance of doctrinal 
unity among the sects.  
To this point in the master narrative, the actions of the Kharijites, and solely those 
of the Kharijites, in the wake of the battle of Siffin and Nahrawan, predominate. The 
Kharijites are depicted as seemingly quixotic and somewhat mercurial, demanding of ‘Ali 
contradictory action concerning the arbitration at Siffin. The zealotry of their demands, 
their abandonment of ‘Ali, and the subsequent violence of the Kharijites unleashed on ‘Ali 
and his followers portend an emerging and mostly negative Kharijite identity. The religious 
motivations attributed to their secession minimize the earlier economic and social 
complaints during the time of the Prophet and that of Uthman. Similarly, the violence 
characteristically ascribed to the Kharijites during this period was perpetrated by all parties 
involved in the first fitna. Why did the negative attributes factor so heavily into Kharijite 
identity when both sides cited religious impetus for their actions and committed violent 
acts to nearly similar degrees?  
C. KHARIJITES ON THE BRINK: KHARIJISM IN THE PERIOD AFTER 
THE FIRST FITNA 
By 665, Kharijite uprisings had accelerated in Basrah after Ziyad ibn ‘Abi Sufyan 
took over as governor of the city.73 The newly appointed governor, having a strong distaste 
for the Kharijite dissidents, swiftly moved against the Kharijites of Basrah. By 670, Ziyad, 
assisted by his deputy Samurah ibn Jundab, squashed the Kharijites of Basrah and began 
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persecuting Kharijite-affiliated persons and groups. Ziyad, threatening to withhold the 
stipend of the Basrahans, attempted to turn the citizens of the city against quietist and 
activist Kharijites alike.74 However, by 672, Kharijite sympathizers and the governor’s 
iron fist gave the Kharijites the space to act against the governor. Qurayb ibn Murrah, along 
with Zahaf ibn Rahar and a group of persecuted Kharijites “put to the sword everyone they 
met on their way without distinction.”75 Again, as the Kharijites sacked the properties and 
mosques of the Banu Qutay’a and Banu, ʻAli they were purported to have shouted “le 
hikama,” a constant refrain of the Kharijites and a reference to God’s sovereignty.76 With 
the city’s orthodox notables’ help, the governor put down the rebellion by nightfall and 
restored order to the city.77  
‘Ubaydallah ibn Ziyad succeeded his father as governor of Iraq in 674 and 
continued the same campaign Kharijite persecution. Again, in an attempt to purge the 
Kufan Kharijites and those with Kharijite sympathies, Ibn Ziyad raised an army and killed 
all seceders or those thought to have Kharijite sympathies.78 By 678, Ibn Ziyad had 
expanded his inquisition to suspected quietest Kharijites. Tensions among Kufans and 
Bashrans alike were ascendant; all wished to avoid the ongoing purge, but a few raised 
questions in opposition to Ibn Ziyad. ‘Urwah ibn Udayyad, a Kufan notable, accused Ibn 
Ziyad of impiety regarding his Kharijite purge. Ibn Ziyad had Ibn Udayyad and his 
daughter killed to illustrate the consequences of Kharijite dissidence against the 
governor.79 
Ibn Udayyad and his daughter’s deaths resulted in Kharijites’ emigration from Kufa 
and an increased response to the governor Ibn Ziyad’s Kharijite purge. The brother of Ibn 
Udayyad, Mirdas ibn Udayyah, led forty Kharijites to Ahwaz, where they would live 
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removed from the community of non-Kharijites and safe from the grasp of Ibn Ziyad.80 In 
681, Mirdas defended Ahwaz against two armies led by Ibn Ziyad, surviving the first and 
falling in the second with all his brethren outside of the village of Tawwaj.81  
In the cases of the early Kharijites depicted here, historiographers detailed the 
Kharijites’ opposition to the state’s authority. In the writings of al-Tabari and Ibn Khayyat, 
the Kharijites pose an existential threat to the stability and power of the growing Umayyad 
caliphate. In consolidating power in Iraq, the Umayyads—through Ibn Ziyad and his 
father—attempted to eliminate the Kharijites, whose existence was perceived as a threat to 
the cohesion and stability of the early Muslim peoples and the state. Proceeding forward in 
time, the same characterization and trend emerge at different points of power consolidation 
of the Umayyads and Abbasids. 
Until 681, Kharijite uprisings were generally small and localized, barring the rather 
large contingent at the Battle of Siffin.82 Localized uprisings akin to those detailed above 
only occurred in Iraq and parts of Persia. However, the succession of Yazid as Caliph upon 
the death of his father Muʻawiya and the ensuing struggle for power between Yazid and 
Ibn al-Zubayr brought the Kharijites back into the struggle to define the caliphate; further, 
Kharijite support of Ibn al-Zubayr in his personal challenge to Yazid would bring about 
doctrinal disagreements between Kharijite factions and ultimately cause the splintering of 
the sect.  
D. IBN ZUBAYR AND THE SCHISM OF THE KHARIJITES 
Upon Yazid becoming Caliph, revolts across the Umayyad caliphate broke out. The 
most notable instance is that of Ibn al-Zubayr, who refused to pledge allegiance to Caliph 
Yazid. Amid the growing opposition to Yazid—and particularly after the Battle of Karbala’ 
in 680, which ended in the death of Caliph ‘Ali’s son Husayn—Ibn al-Zubayr received 
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many pledges and oaths holding him as Caliph.83 These pledges would include the 
majority of Kharijites from Iraq who were eager to support Ibn al-Zubayr and his challenge 
to Umayyad hegemony. The ensuing struggle for power and the untimely death of Yazid 
allowed Ibn al-Zubayr to claim the title of Caliph. However, the Kharijites were not 
unanimous in supporting Ibn al-Zubayr. The Kharijites questioned Ibn al-Zubayr: “What 
do you have to say concerning Uthman?”84 Through this question, the Kharijites tested Ibn 
al-Zubayr on the grounds of their sectarian belief. Ibn al-Zubayr replied, “I am a friend of 
[Uthman] in this world and in the next, and a friend of his friends and an enemy of his 
enemies.” The response left the Kharijites divided between two of their leaders; some 
followed Nafiʼ ibn al-Azraq, others Najda ibn Amir.85 This split not only divided the 
Kharijites in 684 between Nafiʼ and Najda regarding the statements of Ibn al-Zubayr but 
set in motion the branching of the Kharijites over critical doctrinal matters. From the 
evidence provided by al-Shahrastani, Nafi’ held that “those who did not join the 
[Kharijites] and proactively participate in jihad were polytheists and, as such, legitimate 
targets of violence and plunder, even their women and children.”86 For Najda and his 
followers, adherence to this doctrine was deemed too extreme, and thus Nafi’ was declared 
an unbeliever. Thus, the schism gave rise to the Najdat and Azariqa.87 
E. THE AZARIQA AND THE NAJDAT KHARIJITES 
Between the Azariqa and the Najdat, the attributes of the Azariqa are those 
associated with the Kharijites of the master narrative. The Azariqa, as noted earlier, held 
extreme views regarding the prosecution of jihad and takfir (declaring one to be an 
unbeliever). The Azariqa interpreted sections of the Qur’an concerning ‘Ali and his 
assassin to extol the latter as “the one who sells himself, seeking the approval of God” and 
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the former in a negative and “contentious” light.88 A chief concern of Islamic 
heresiographers and thus a major focus of the master narrative was the Azariqa belief that 
children of those deemed unbelievers were damned to eternal punishment in hell with their 
parents. Furthermore, the Azariqa found it permissible to confiscate a waqf (religious 
endowment) that existed outside of the Kharijite sect.89  Not only did the Azariqa hold that 
jihad was compulsory for believers but encouraged the killing of other Muslims considered 
by the group as non-believers.  
The affinity for violence in the name of belief extended to members within its ranks. 
Those wishing to join the ranks of the Azariqa were put through a test termed the “trial of 
a soldier.”90 In this trial, the potential member was asked to prove his loyalty by executing 
a captive. Once he had done so, he gained entry to the sect. If he failed, the potential entrant 
was deemed an unbeliever and killed on the spot.91 Harrowing tales, such as that described 
in the “trial of the soldier,” factor into the parable and mythic nature of the master narrative, 
even though such acts were only perpetrated by a small minority of Kharijites within the 
Islamic realm. The Azariqa, with their infamous exploits and violent tendencies, act as a 
phantom residue upon the whole of the Kharijites, which has endured through the ages.  
Described as an “indiscriminate massacre,” the first of the Azariqa uprisings 
occurred in the location of the original secession, southern Iraq.92 Ibn Khayyat and al-
Tabari portray the battles waged by the Azariqa as brutal and in the tradition of the Kharijite 
condition. Nafi’ was killed in the initial battles, but the Azariqa continued to succeed in 
battle from their camp at Ahwaz until 684 and the entrance of al-Muhallab ibn Abi Sufra.93 
Appointed by the erstwhile ally of the Azariqa, self-proclaimed caliph Ibn-Zubayr, al-
Muhallab pushed the Azariqa out of Ahwaz and pursued them across Kirman and Isfahan 
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in southwestern Persia.94 The Azariqa would do battle with al-Muhallab until 696, when 
internal doctrine struggles yet again split the ranks of the Azariqa Kharijites.95 Inter-
Azariqa fighting wore the factions down to the point to which al-Muhallab was able to 
drive the remnant bands of Azariqa to the Tabaristan region of northern Persia. However, 
the Azariqa death knell was sounded by Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, governor of the eastern 
portion of the Umayyad caliphate, who wiped out the remaining Azariqa.96 Like the 
Azariqa, the Najdat would suffer a similar fate in central Arabia. 
After the schism that separated the Najdat from the Azariqa in 684, the Najdat 
established a state in central Arabia; however, like the Azariqa, internal disputes severed 
the Najdat state. At its zenith, the state reached from Oman to Bahrain to al-Hassa to its 
capital in central Arabia and matched the military power of the Caliphate of ‘Abd al-
Malik.97 The state was powerful enough that ‘Abd al-Malik sought diplomatic avenues to 
resolve issues rather than challenge them outright.98 Several of the Najdat leaders sought 
control of the various portions of the empire for themselves, namely, ‘Atiyya ibn al-Aswad 
pursued a Najdat Imamate in Oman.99 Additional disagreements concerning al-Najda’s 
leadership and his willingness to forgive non-believers whose ignorance of Islam was 
considered a grave sin by the Kharijites up to that time continued. Such disagreements led 
to the removal of Najda from power and his subsequent murder.100 Caliph Abd al-Malik, 
capitalizing on the disarray within the ranks of the Najdat, sent an army to Arabia and 
eradicated the Najdat state and all of its inhabitants.101 
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F. THE MASTER NARRATIVE IN CONTEMPORARY STUDIES  
In almost all medieval heresiographies and histories, the Kharijite master narrative 
generally subsides around this period, approximately around the end of the seventh century 
A.D. Heresiographers, such as Shahrastani, continued to document the Kharijites’ 
splintering during the Abbasid Caliphate, focusing on their unorthodox doctrine and their 
pseudo-anarchic way of life.102 The medieval scholars of the period continue to describe 
the various Kharijite rebellions that occur over the next two centuries, applying the same 
polemical narrative derived from the original narrative. By the dawn of the eighth century, 
all Kharijites save the Ibadiyya in Oman and pockets of North Africa, were soundly 
eliminated by the state. In the case of the Ibadiyya, their quietism and doctrinal 
differences—namely those which allow them to co-exist with non-Kharijite Muslims and 
the eschewing of Azariqa tendencies for violence103—led to their ultimate survival. 
Contemporary understanding of the Kharijites in both the Western and non-
Western corpus has been indelibly affected by the Master Kharijite narrative, often with 
the group being presented with a toxic façade. Whether modern scholars accept the epic 
narrative—read that of the heresiographers—at face value or Arab apologists attempt to 
combat the master narrative, the constructed Kharijite identity is intrinsically linked to the 
lexicon of the eleventh and twelfth-century polemical scholars.  
There are distinct misperceptions generated from the master narrative that continue 
to permeate the mainstream understanding of the Kharijites within the Islamic tradition. Of 
the many, the misperception of the Kharijites as an essentialist, malignant group is the most 
historically sticky; moreover, this misperception was arguably the primary goal of the 
polemicists who constructed the narrative, the Kharijites were considered a “cancer within 
the community.”104 In turn, this characterization gave clear justification for the Caliphate 
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and the orthodox ulema, which the Caliphate represented—to systematically and violently 
excise the Kharijites from the Islamic community.  
The religious and cultural stickiness of the Kharijite master narrative pervades the 
corpus of modern scholarship. Among many Western scholars of Islam, the master 
narrative defines the discourse surrounding the Kharijites. Daniel W. Brown, in A New 
Introduction to Islam, describes the Kharijites as zealots “[willing] to sell their lives in 
martyrdom.”105 Though Brown does tacitly acknowledge the complexity and concomitant 
political nature of the Kharijite impetus by describing them as “principled egalitarians,” he 
accepts the orthodox and polemical dialogue that undergirds the mainstream narrative of 
the sect.106 Hussam Timani notes that both Western and non-Western scholars of Islam 
have used the narrative “to promote and reflect modern ideologies and religious beliefs,” 
notably modern Islamic fundamentalism and “psychological ideologies.”107 Brown and 
other Western scholars appear to offer the general interpretations of Muslim 
heresiographers and historiographers; by accepting and transmitting this narrative, they 
promulgate the accepted tradition in a non-critical manner that redacts and ignores other 
sources that would deepen the contemporary understanding of the Kharijites. Other 
scholars who have commented on the Kharijites use a limited amount of medieval, 
polemical quotes and single-sourced interpretations of the group.108 Thus, the Kharijites’ 
legacy is reified into “mono-dimensional extremists”109 in which the only concern of the 
first sectarians of Islam is strict adherence to doctrine, regardless of the cost to human life, 
society, and the cohesion of the Caliphate.  
Of the many redactions in the narrative of the Kharijites, medieval Islamic 
scholarship neglects the secular factors governing the behavior of the group in order to 
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focus on its violent tendencies as opposed to its social, economic, and political desires. 
Among Kharijite complaints were those of the pre-eminence of tribal law, the ascendancy 
of the Quraysh, and the division of booty from the wars of Islamic expansion.110 Before 
the events of the secession at Siffin, tribes traditionally associated with the Qurra’ of Iraq 
grew increasingly critical of the corrupt reign of ‘Uthman and the economic and political 
hegemony of the notables of Medina and receipt of greater portions of fay lands, or the 
lands claimed or derived from battle.111 The “inveterate malcontents” and “innately 
rebellious individuals” brought claims against the Ansar (citizens of Medina) that resulted 
in a chain of violent events in Medina and Kufa.112 In this case, the proto-Kharijites, rather 
than basing their desires on Quranic verses, were motivated by the corruption of tribal law 
and the enrichment of the Quraysh.113 Other tribal leaders who would go on to be 
Kharijites railed against the expansion of the power and wealth of the Umayyad governors. 
The proto-Kharijites under the banner of Ibn al-Ash’ath argued that they were not granted 
the proper apportionment of land due to their participation in previous military campaigns. 
They argued that the Umayyad governor intended to “devour the territory and appropriate 
[its] wealth, thereby extending his dominion,” leaving fallow land to the proto-
Kharijites.114 Again, the formulation of Kharijite motivations ulterior to those depicted in 
the master narrative are omitted from the formative writings of the twelfth century to 
demonize the Kharijites rather than present them as a group with sympathetic political, 
economic, and social complaints against the Caliphate. 
The Kharijites were far from the only sect or group that instigated violent uprisings 
and dissent; rather, the master narrative and the various medieval Islamic histories paper-
over the many rebellions and insurrections motivated by various compulsions—religious 
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or otherwise—that bear a close resemblance to those of the Kharijites.115 Notably, that of 
Ibn al-Zubayr, discussed previously, the pro-’Alid rebellion in Kufa led by al-Mukhtar ibn 
Abi’Ubaydah al-Thaqafi, and that of ʻAbd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn al-Ashʻath in 
what is now the Sistan region of Iran.116 In all cases, the insurrections were caged in 
religious motivation with the concomitant political machinations against the Caliphate’s 
authority. Violent, anti-establishment, and religiously based, all three revolts bear a striking 
resemblance to that of the Kharijites in all but name.  
The violent events and tendencies of the Azariqa and their extreme resolution of 
doctrinal differences with proto-orthodox Muslims and other Kharijites represent focal 
points of the master narrative; however, the focus of Islamic polemicists on the sensational 
and disconcerting aspects of the Kharijites betrays the prevalence of violence, unrest, and 
rebellion that colored the layers of sectarian division in the first centuries of Islam. The 
massacres perpetrated at the hands of the Azariqa are extolled as the model of the Kharijite 
condition. This is problematic in two respects: the distillation of Kharijite identity to a 
minority of actors incorrectly simplifies the diversity of Kharijite action and doctrine. The 
violent behavior exhibited by the Azariqa is not aberrant behavior when contrasted with 
other sectarians and groups of the time.117 The massacre of three thousand seceders at al-
Nahrawan, the bloody execution of Abu Bilal, and the massacre of Husayn and his 
followers are just three examples of the real violence and brutality of the age. In the early 
years of Islam, violence was the chief tool of compulsion; violence perpetrated at the hands 
of the Umayyad or Abbasid governments was no more or less violent than that committed 
by the Kharijite group. The Kharijites’ expressions were just one arrow in a quiver of 
dissension that plagued the early Islamic period and caliphal authority. In this context, why 
were the revolts of Kharijite doppelganger movements not vilified in the same manner as 
those of the original Kharijites? Why are these movements omitted from the lexicon of 
heresiography that relegates the Kharijites to infamy and the status of a timeless and 
essentialist evil? 
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G. A NARRATIVE THAT STICKS 
Crucial to this work and the longevity, strength, and indelible qualities of the 
Kharijite master narrative—and its subsequent use as a curse or aspersion—is the following 
question: who was motivated to portray the Kharijites in such a manner, and what was their 
motivation? During the Abbasid era, the Caliphate’s need to consolidate power within its 
domain and legitimize the government’s authority against rival claims to the Caliphate are 
the two main factors that led to the marginalization and vilification of the Kharijites. The 
master narrative of the original seceders indicates that scholars—those of the 
heresiographical and historiographical bent—labeled the Kharijites as the bogeymen of 
Islam; the near annihilation of the Kharijites meant that the narrative would likely not be 
refuted by extant Kharijite populations or met with any threat from remaining members of 
the community. 
With their divergent and unorthodox doctrine, the Kharijites proved exemplars of 
purported dissidence, rebellion, and evil…so much so that the group was a perfect target 
for polemicists. With the Abbasid caliphate’s founding and the destruction of the 
Umayyads, the religiously caged discourse that the Kharijites utilized to justify opposition 
to the Umayyads was no longer relevant;118 the change in regime and religious discourse 
minimized their relevance. Their ideological and physical obsolescence was only made 
clearer by their elimination from the Caliphate’s core.119 Being fringe in both doctrine and 
location, the Kharijites’ reduced position proved ideal for those wishing to define Islamic 
orthodoxy and the religious and social mores of the Abbasid era.  
Throughout the ages, the Kharijites came to represent the eternal form of rebellion, 
duplicity, and the dangers of religious extremism while simultaneously serving the political 
ends of both religious and political authority to legitimate and justify the reign of the 
Abbasids and the orthodoxy of the ulema. Their heresy, along with the many other heresies 
of Islamic antiquity, were judged as too extreme and illegitimate. Orthodox Sunnism 
emerged as the moderate form of Islam from the heresies deemed too extreme and 
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destabilizing; though the contradistinctions drawn by the proto-Sunni ulema are generally 
common to all heresies, the Kharijite heresy was viewed as too extreme by most Islamic 
sects and many of those deemed heretical by the Sunnis. This distinction makes the 
Kharijite heresy unique. Thus, the imagery and narrative associated with the Kharijites 
served as a useful and nearly universally understood tool for the Abbasids to demonize the 
Kharijites and the Umayyads, all while lifting up the Abbasids. As discussed previously, 
Al-Shahrastani elucidates in al-Milal that a Kharijite is “whoever rebelled against the 
legitimate imam accepted by the people…whether this rebellion took place at the time of 
the Companions [of the Prophet] against the rightfully guided imams, or their worthy 
successors, or against the imams of any time.”120 This definition places the Kharijites as a 
perpetual challenge to humanity, its decency, the rule of law, and above all, those appointed 
to rule over the masses. The Kharijites are further associated with Iblis, an intercessor 
associated with the devil and a source of evil in the Islamic vernacular.121 This association 
gives political and violent powers, vested in a religious dialogue, to those in power so that 
those whom they protect are safeguarded from the pernicious and malevolent grasp of the 
heretical Kharijites. 
In arguing this work’s main thesis, it is vital to understand the metamorphosis of 
the master narrative of the Kharijites—a sectarian group among the many of its time—into 
an unquestionably negative phenomenon to serve the purposes of consolidating state power 
and legitimacy in the early years of the Abbasid Caliphate.122 At the time of its creation, 
the master narrative helped solidify the emerging Islamic orthodoxy and enshrine the 
power of not only the Abbasids but the innovated institution of the Caliphate itself. This 
study argues that the staying power and impact of the Kharijite narrative—and the use of 
the brand Kharijite—has proven useful to modern regimes and non-state actors within the 
Middle East, seeking to solidify their authority and legitimacy through the well-worn 
Islamic idioms understood by an Islamic polity. 
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III. THE MODERN EGYPTIAN CASE 
As reviewed in the previous chapter, the master narrative of the Kharijites portrayed 
the group as an essentialist malady haunting humankind to promote the power and authority 
of the caliphate. Though the polemical narrative of the Kharijites belongs to a bygone era 
almost a millennium removed from the present day, the narrative’s re-emergence in Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia, and Egypt attests to its potency and longevity within Islamic religiopolitical 
discourse, as well as the state’s ability to mobilize sentiments and opinions by invoking the 
narrative. However, no more overt instance of the term’s utilization exists than in post-
Revolutionary Egypt, where the confluence of nascent authority, governing ideologies, 
popular legitimacy, and the formation of the Weberian state all occurred within an Islamic 
cultural context. 
From the overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy in 1952 to the regime of President 
Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, the use of the term Kharijite has permeated and at times dominated 
the political and religious discourse in Egypt. Though the invocation of the term was meant 
to delegitimize the Islamist groups all while imbuing the regime with Islamic legitimacy, 
it only partially accomplished its original goal. Rather, the charge of Kharijite was met 
with varying responses based on the time of its use and the context in which it was invoked. 
As the understanding of religious extremism and politically motivated violence evolved, 
so too did the understanding and consequences of using the Kharijite epithet.123 The 
syllogistic charge of neo-Kharijism used against Islamist groups proved helpful by 
temporarily mobilizing support for the ruling regime by casting Nasser as ‘Ali and instilling 
his ideology with an Islamic character. However, the persistent invocation of the Kharijite 
narrative disguised the failings of the Egyptian state and the regime’s ability to provide a 
solution to the complex milieu of social, economic, and political issues in which the “neo-
Kharijites” emerged.124 By evoking the master narrative and laying it over the ill-fitting 
mold of twentieth-century Egyptian society, the Egyptian regime sought to consolidate 
 
123 Kenney, Muslim Rebels, chap. 4. 
124 The term “neo-Kharijite” is a moniker often given to Islamist groups, whether violent or non-violent, to 
associate the organization with characteristics of the ancient Kharijites. 
36 
their political power and eliminate challenges from outgroups deemed extremists, 
Islamists, and illegitimate.  
Before proceeding with the era of Nasser, a discussion of the years before the 1952 
Revolution and its immediate aftermath bear discussion in order to understand the 
religious, economic, and political milieu of Egypt. 
A. THE BUILD-UP TO REVOLUTION 
The period from 1919 to 1952 is often deemed the liberal age of Egypt or “the 
liberal experiment” marked by indicative liberal traits and institutions; however, the period 
exemplified the political and socio-economic hallmarks of the waning colonial era and 
British colonial rule.125 While many Egyptians living in the urban and cosmopolitan 
environments of Cairo and Alexandria, as well as those of the political and aristocratic 
elite, benefited from the modernization dating back to the rule of Muhammed ‘Ali in the 
late nineteenth century, the majority of Egyptians did not. Wafd party political elites were 
viewed as royal or British proxies; instead, many Egyptians viewed the Wafd as a 
roadblock to Egypt’s political progression and modernization.126 Though nominally 
independent, Egypt under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 was all but a dependency of 
the United Kingdom, which maintained full control of the Suez Canal and critical positions 
across the country at the end of the Second World War.127 Resentment of colonial rule and 
growing Egyptian nationalism, combined with the overtly inept and corrupt monarchy of 
King Faruq and growing Egyptian disenchantment with the political and economic life, 
made Egypt ripe for revolution. 
In pre-revolutionary Egypt, the creation of powerful religious movements and 
political cabals –namely the Muslim Brotherhood, and later, the Free Officers—
undergirded the crescendo of political and military discord that would eventually result in 
the Revolution of 1952. The Free Officers, a secret clique of military officers and civilians 
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consisting of Gamal Abd al-Nasser, Anwar al-Sadat, and other young officers such as 
Zakariya Muhyi al-Din and Abd al-Hakim Amir, coalesced in the 1940s out of associations 
made at the Egyptian Military Academy and through service in the Egyptian military.128 
From their often humble beginnings in middle- and lower-class families, the young men of 
the Free Officers, were ambitious for not only themselves but for their nation.129 Though 
bound by association, the Free Officers had little, if any, unifying ideology. Though 
“Nasserism” would come to define the Free Officer movement in the late 1950s and 60s, 
“the young officers felt that Egypt’s welfare immediately depended on destroying all points 
of the power triangle: the Wafd, the king, and the British.”130 The Free Officers, in 
conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations, perceived 
themselves as capable of overcoming the acien régime. 
Along with the Free Officers, the Muslim Brotherhood formed the other prominent 
pre-revolutionary movement that saw Egypt’s future in Islamic terms. Founded by Hassan 
al-Banna in 1928 in Ismailia, the Society of Muslim Brothers sought the restoration of 
Islamic institutions as the principal feature of Egypt’s political future. In contrast to the 
Free Officers’ vague and anti-colonial fervor, the Muslim Brotherhood saw the fabric of 
Egyptian life in an idealized, moral-religious paradigm, one which had been constructed 
from its founding in 1928 to the time of the Revolution in 1952.131 The Brotherhood 
eschewed the political, economic, and secular trappings of Westernized societies’ thrust 
upon the Egyptian people in favor of the totality of the Islamic system. As such, the 
Brotherhood rejected political parties, constitutions, and elected parliament, and above all, 
the relegation of Islam into a distinctly religious sector of Egyptian life severed from that 
of the political, social, and economic. The group reached its zenith during the Arab-Israeli 
War of 1948, with membership reaching over five-hundred thousand, two thousand 
established branches, a women’s group aptly named the Muslim Sisters, and a vital youth 
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component called the Rovers.132 Within the life of the many rural and impoverished 
Egyptian, the Brotherhood was responsible for the provision of public services, welfare, 
clinics, and schools; however, the militant inclinations of individual members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood directly led to the codification of the outwardly violent agenda of the 
Brotherhood’s Secret Apparatus.133  
The Secret Apparatus, the clandestine and violent arm of the Muslim Brotherhood 
that executed attacks against Western establishments and conducted political assassination, 
presaged the Brotherhood’s characterization as neo-Kharijites. The Secret Apparatus, its 
growing brazen and overt acts of violence and assassinations against fellow revolutionaries 
and the increasingly violent manifestos of notable Brothers such as Sayyed Qutb, led to the 
growing divide and the eventual irreparable schism between the revolutionary Free 
Officers and the Muslim Brotherhood.134 This break between the two groups in concert 
with the overlaid political and religious dialogue proved fertile ground for the re-
emergence of the phenomenon of Kharijism and the split between the orthodoxy of the 
newly minted regime and that of a rebellious, intransigent minority of extremists.  
B. TWO VISIONS OF ONE EGYPT: THE SCHISM OF THE MUSLIM 
BROTHERHOOD AND THE FREE OFFICERS 
The revolutionary coalition of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers 
deteriorated between the two years after the revolution; what was once a mutually 
beneficial political relationship devolved into one that would define the dichotomy of the 
orthodox, centralized authority of the Free Officer regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. In 
the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the Muslim Brothers were incorporated into the 
government formed by the Free Officers.135 High Ranking members of the Brotherhood 
were granted “special consultive status” and even cabinet-level positions with proximity to 
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power and policymaking.136 Sayed Qutb, a leading member of the Brotherhood in the first 
years of the revolution, was the only non-Free Officer, civilian member of the revolutionary 
council in the two years before his arrest in 1954.137 Though members of the Brotherhood 
were suspicious of the Free Officers’ socialist and secular motivations, many of the 
revolutionary government’s first political moves seemed compatible with the Islamist 
vision the Brotherhood had for Egypt. The banning of political parties, a move that the free 
officers enacted swiftly in an attempt to stifle their opponents, seemed part and parcel of 
the Islamist agenda.138 The Muslim Brotherhood, however, was notably excluded from the 
ban on political organizations and societies.139 As Jeffrey Kenney notes, “since it was 
unthinkable for Islam to have to compete for Muslim support every election cycle, only 
one party needed to represent the people—the one that instituted Islamic rule.”140 This 
political move and others like it formed the façade in which the Free Officers embraced 
particular notions from a diverse range of ideology sets, all designed to bolster their 
authority and confer legitimacy upon their fledgling regime. The Free Officer’s embrace 
of the Muslim Brotherhood was just as thin.  
Though nominally part of the newly formed regime, the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
power was diluted and held up as a superficial symbol of unity to extort the maximum 
political, social, and religious concessions from the Brotherhood’s organization and 
apparatus. The Muslim Brotherhood, with its expansive social and public goods networks 
across the country, and chiefly, its name recognition, conferred a sense of legitimacy 
familiar to the Egyptian people upon the newly formed regime.141 The language of 
socialism, secularism, and later, Nasserism, were not components of the Islamic-Egyptian 
lexicon that permeated the populous mid-century; but that of the Brotherhood, the lexicon 
based in the Quran, Hadith, and the socio-religious networks, was widely understood by 
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the Egyptian people and the broader Arab world. Though the Brotherhood shied from the 
political arena and the venal practices of politics, they were consummate political animals 
in every sense of the term; the leadership of the Brotherhood had stumped, politicked, and 
established outreach to every corner of Egypt, and had long-established ties dating back 
decades. However, the tokenization of the Brotherhood and its disenfranchisement from 
real political power was clear to their leadership, causing the rapid dissolution of the one-
sided political marriage.142  
After repeated political disagreements and increasingly violent confrontations, the 
relationship between the Brotherhood and the Free Officers collapsed, presaging the 
following half-centuries’ struggle between the state and the Islamist movements. Attempts 
to salvage the relationship by Colonel Nasser, General Neguib, and Supreme Guide of the 
Brothers, Hasan al-Hudaybi, ultimately failed due to the gulf of political obstacles between 
the groups.143 The political animosity between the two organizations had reached a violent 
fever pitch. While giving an open-air speech in Alexandria in 1954, the Muslim 
Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Colonel Nasser.144 The assassination attempt on 
Nasser provided the requisite circumstances to neutralize the Brotherhood and its 
organization systematically.145 Through a series of public kangaroo courts and trials where 
the judicial pretext was dubious at best, many high-ranking members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood were sentenced to death while others were sentenced to life in prison. This 
assassination attempt and the precipitating political theater yielded the first cycle of the 
highly publicized political rancor between the Brotherhood and the state.146 However, more 
critically, the assassination attempt provided an opening for the Free Officers to 
characterize their opponents as not only a political bogeyman, but more specifically, an 
Islamic bogeyman. By adopting the religious idioms so well-worn and understood by all 
Muslims, the Free Officers co-opted religious institutions, the faculties of state, and 
 
142 Kenney, 64–67. 
143 Soage, “Islamism and Modernity,” 191. 
144 Soage, 191. 
145 Soage, 191. 
146 Kenney, Muslim Rebels, 150. 
41 
mobilized popular sentiments against the Muslim Brotherhood to buttress their political 
power and secure the legitimacy lacking in their revolutionary regime. In essence, by 
invoking the Kharijite “master narrative,” Nasser and the government re-invented an 
essentialist struggle between state and outgroup grounded in an Islamic epithet. 
C. NATION-STATE FORMATION AND POLITICAL-RELIGION AS 
IDEOLOGY 
The suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954 marks a point where two 
influential concepts of the formation, development, and sustainment of the modern nation-
state—particularly those of post-colonial and under-developed origins—are critical in 
understanding the re-emergence of the master narrative of the Kharijites: Max Weber’s 
definition of the modern state and David Ernest Apter’s thesis on political religion. Max 
Weber defines the modern state as “a human community that [successfully] claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”147 In Egypt’s 
case, the nascent regime of Nasser and the Free Officers, in overthrowing the Muhammed 
‘Ali dynasty and installing a novel form of government, theoretically met the criteria for a 
modern state but sought to make Weber’s maxim a reality.148 By eliminating the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s ability to contest or express political power through violence or authoritative 
action, the Free Officers established their ability, albeit tenuously, to monopolize the use 
of violence within the bounds of the Egyptian state.149 While the Brotherhood and other 
Islamist groups would challenge this throughout Egypt’s modern history, Nasser and his 
regime had consolidated this power over Egypt’s principal territories and within the minds 
of the Egyptian people. In 1954, however, Nasser controlled a state but was searching for 
a legitimizing ideology to guide Egypt into modernization.  
The second concept that applies to invoking the Kharijites’ master narrative is 
“political religion,” and Nasser’s co-opting of Islamic symbolism to increase the legitimacy 
of the state. As defined by Apter, political religion is an ideological system in which “the 
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state and the regime take on sacred characteristics” that imbues the regime and its 
leadership with god-like or religious qualities.150 A regime bound by a political religion 
ideology does not necessarily take on the multifaceted, multidimensional trappings of 
religion but may selectively recall “the common trappings of religion such as ceremony, 
doctrine, and myth.”151 By blending many modern ideologies with that of the Islamic idiom 
understood by the masses and well established within the extant social and religious 
institutions of Egypt, Nasser, through the process of establishing a complex and diverse 
ideology, adopted a selective panoply of iconic Islamic themes, myths, and rituals to 
express his innovated ideology in a way relatable and consumable by Egyptians. Apter 
contends that political religion is a useful tool of popular mobilization; infant states utilize 
political religion to rapidly organize and re-shuffle the economic and societal status quo 
without the necessary institutional, social, and political infrastructure generally required to 
enact such change.152 In discussing Nasser’s use of political religion, Jeffrey Kenney notes: 
For any nation, modernization brings change, innovation, and dislocation, 
all of which place stress on individuals, families, and other traditional social 
institutions. Mobilization systems attempt to offset this stress by politicizing 
all spheres of life and by drawing citizens into a cult of the state. They avert, 
at least temporarily, the bane of modernizing societies—a crisis of 
identity—through the organizational and coercive powers of the central 
authority. Meaning and identity, then, are products of the state, imposed 
through a combination of strategies: authoritarian policies, political rituals, 
propaganda, and, if necessary, the police.153  
In the instance of Egypt, the formation of Nasserism and the contrivance to use political 
religion to confer regime and popular legitimacy was an ambitious undertaking that only 
marginally allowed Nasser to achieve his political, economic, and social modernization 
scheme. Nasser viewed secular Arabism as the lynchpin of his hybridized ideology. Yet, 
the use of the Kharijite narrative placed the state within an understood and accepted Islamic 
paradigm; thus, fundamental religious and historical identities shaped the modern Egyptian 
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narrative of orthodox, state-centric groups against marginalized outgroups. In Nasser’s 
eyes, Islam was an exploitable cultural-religious mechanism in which authority, longevity, 
and long-established tenets could be wielded and bent to the needs of the state, and above 
all, the leader.154 
D. RELIGIOUS VALIDATION: AL-AZHAR AND THE STATE-FICTION OF 
OFFICIAL ISLAM 
In the modern history of Egypt, both before and after the revolution, religious 
institutions, and the infrastructure of “official Islam” has been connected to, if not directly 
under the control and direction of the political establishment. Al-Azhar, the foremost 
school and authority within Sunni Islam, and “the embodiment of official Islam,” was no 
exception to this phenomenon.155 Though changes to the structure and organization of 
Azhar by both pre-and post-revolutionary governments of Egypt gave the ruling elite 
control of the Orthodox Islamic levers within Egypt and beyond, Nasser’s reformation of 
al-Azhar demonstrated the power of official Islam to execute the will of the state. 
Therefore, it is pivotal to understand the role of al-Azhar in invoking the master Kharijite 
narrative.  
In the wake of the revolution of 1952, the Free officers courted Azharite leaders 
through soft engagement. Religious institutions, including al-Azhar, had undergone many 
reforms in the pre-revolutionary period to include social and religious functions and 
religious authorities being systemized and limited by legal and bureaucratic code.156 The 
Free Officers expanded upon these early reforms in order achieve a two-fold outcome “that 
sent mixed messages about the secular versus religious nature of the regime: weaken 
existing religious institutions that hindered reform, and create new religious institutions 
that subverted traditional authority and empowered voices of reform.”157 First, the Free 
Officers created the Islamic Congress—a purely symbolic international Islamic body 
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headed by Anwar Sadat, a then member of the Free Officers—to displace the religious 
guidance of traditional institutions, both within Egypt and abroad.158 Second, the Free 
Officers created a parallel structure and set of responsibilities with the Ministry of Awqaf 
(religious endowments) by creating the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, which served 
the same function the Ministry under its Director-General. This permitted the regime’s 
religious and social reforms to proceed unhindered by recalcitrant religious holdouts within 
the existing religious structure. However, the 1961 restructuring of al-Azhar would be the 
most sweeping, one that “could provide political tribune, could represent a counter-power 
to the Muslim Brothers if used properly, and provide [the regime] with its Islamic 
legitimacy.”159  
Though reform of al-Azhar and the Ministry of Awqaf were codified in the 1961 
al-Azhar Law—Law No. 103—which maintained the façade of al-Azhar’s independence, 
its remaining autonomy was now subject to complete control of the state.160 Nasser 
exploited existing rifts within the clerical class of the Azhari scholars; progressive and 
conservative factions were split over organizational matters and the intellectual morass of 
the university.161 Al-Azhar became a public university with its faculty, staff, and students 
becoming subject to government oversight and intervention. The curriculum of the 
university now included the secular subject of the arts and sciences. The Grand Imam, or 
Shaykh al-Azhar, was now directly appointed by the Egyptian president, bestowed with 
the rank of minister, and salaried on the state roles. According to Malika Zeghal, “al-Azhar 
as an institution became the religious tribune of the regime of Nasser and gave religious 
edicts or fatwas as the authoritarian state required them. At the head of the institution, 
official ulema served the political power’s interests once those few who refused to submit 
to the demands of the regime resigned.”162 The weakening of al-Azhar, both as an 
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independent religious institution capable of providing Islamic legal jurisprudence and an 
autonomous political actor within the landscape of Nasser’s Egypt, left room for other 
state-dominated apparatuses to control the religiopolitical narrative of the new republic  
Through the restructuring of al-Azhar, the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs 
came to dominate all aspects of religious policy within Egypt and played a crucial role in 
framing the Muslim Brotherhood as neo-Kharijites. Notably, the publishing arm of al-
Azhar, Minbar al-Islam, would come to play an important role in legitimizing the authority 
of the new republic and religiously sanctifying their monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence.163 While Minbar al-Islam was key in religiously socializing Nasserism and the 
suite of reforms enacted by the Free Officers, the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs in 
conjunction with other organizations of the state, and state-held publications such as al-
Ahram, Egypt’s newspaper of record, were the critical amplifiers of the religious discourse 
promulgated by the state;164 this message cast the Muslim Brotherhood as the Kharijite 
outgroup seeking to destroy the fabric of Egyptian society while the guardians of the new 
Egyptian society, under the aegis of the Islamic shroud al-Azhar provided, sought to 
modernize and advance the state of Egypt. The penetration of the state within the ecosystem 
of “official Islam” and its mechanisms of widespread outreach proved useful in the 1965 
prosecution of the Muslim Brotherhood, in both judicial proceedings and within the domain 
of public opinion. As Jeffrey Kenney emphasizes, “it was the Supreme Council of Islamic 
Affairs that also issued a collection of anti–Muslim Brother essays entitled The Opinion of 
Religion Concerning the Brothers of Satan, that captured the prominence and type of anti-
extremist rhetoric” actively used by the state throughout the 1960s and 70s.165 Thusly, the 
charge of Kharijism fit within the arrangement of the state-controlled Islamic orthodoxy to 
minimize the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood and confer the legitimacy sought by the 
Free Officers.  
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E. THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEO-KHARIJITES: SAYYID QUTB AND 
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 
This section documents the use of the master narrative of the Kharijites by state or 
state-associated entities within Egypt in the 1960s against the Muslim Brotherhood, as well 
as an analysis of the writings of Sayed Qutb that were deemed to be those of a Kharijite. 
While this period does include two discrete instances, in 1948 and 1952, respectively, the 
government directly charged the Muslim Brotherhood of Kharijism or the handful of 
popular publications that tepidly dabbled in pseudo-heresiography and the branding of 
modern Islamist movements.166 According to Richard Mitchell, both instances saw the 
charge leveled against the group, followed by a swift and substantial rebuttal. While these 
cases do not substantially influence the adoption of the term as a curse by Nasser and later 
leaders of Egypt, it demonstrates the existence of the narrative within Egyptian society and 
the government’s awareness of its potential use in minimizing or neutralizing the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  
The master narrative of the Kharijites became increasingly important in 1965 when 
it was discovered that the Muslim Brotherhood “attempted” a coup and political 
assassinations. Just eight months after his 15-year stint in prison following the banning of 
the Brotherhood in 1954, Qutb and a large number of Muslim Brothers were arrested and 
sentenced to death or further imprisonment in 1965.167 Charges against Qutb and the 
brothers centered around a plot to overthrow the revolutionary regime of Nasser, among 
other accusations—planned assassinations of celebrities and politicians as well as the 
destruction of the Aswan High Dam.168 In this second cycle of the Egyptian’s state 
crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, the writings of Qutb, notably Ma’alim fi’l-Tariq 
(Signposts along the Road) and Fizilal al-Qur’an (In the Shade of the Qur’an), were the 
centerpiece to the case of the state against the Brotherhood and the grounds for labeling 
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Qutb and the Brotherhood as Kharijites.169 While serving his prison sentence after the 1954 
crackdown on the Brotherhood, “Qutb continued his passion for writing, completing the 
two previous works that became modern classics among Islamists around the world.”170 
When arresting Qutb the Muslim Brothers in 1965, Egyptian authorities found copies of 
Signposts in every suspected putschist’s homes.171 Content of both Signposts and In the 
Shade of the Quran were held up as neo-Kharijite doctrine that codified the brotherhood 
behavior of takfir, removal of an unjust/un-Islamic leader, violent Jihad, assassinations, 
and the Islamic essentialism ascribed to the Kharijites.  
Qutb’s extensive writings and his understanding of Islam were a product of the 
early Islamist and Salafist movements and the perceived crisis of Islamic society.172 Jamal 
al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad’ Abduh, the forefathers of the emergent Salafist and 
Islamist movements in the late nineteenth century, emphasized Islam’s rational nature, 
strict adherence to the text of the Quran, and denounced interpretation of the Quran to fit 
within the contemporary scientific understanding.173 Expounding on al-Afghani and 
Abduh, along with others like Abu al-A’la Mawdudi and Muslim Brotherhood founder 
Hassan al-Banna, Qutb’s writing during his stint in prison from 1954 to 1964 took on an 
increasingly violent and abstract anti-establishment.174 The welfare of the urban and rural 
poor, education, and wealth disparities characterize Qutb’s earlier writings. However, 
shirk—generally considered polytheism or idol worship within Islam—and “the failure to 
recognize the absolute sovereignty of God in areas of life,” hakamiyya, were the sources 
of all worldly problems and the political, social, and economic plagues on Islamic 
society.175 Qutb held that the entire world, including Muslim societies ruled by secular and 
non-Islamic ideologies and systems, existed in a state of jahiliyya, or ignorance, a period 
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of polytheism and before the revelations of Muhammad.176 Qutb suggested that worldly 
efforts to govern by human-made laws and the interpretation of God’s laws to meet the 
needs of humanity were anathema to the Quran. In his interpretation, Islam applied the 
totality of society and formed a system in which life was ordered according to God’s word: 
science, history, society, politics, the state, economics, and religious institutions. This stark 
interpretation of Islam, the contrast between Muslim and kaffir, unbeliever, presented 
Muslims living within jahiliyya societies with a dilemma to which Qutb had a proposed 
solution. Jahiliyya is so great, in Qutb’s estimation, “that Muslims can no longer think and 
act like Muslims.”177 Thus, Muslim societies are completely absent from the world in 
which Qutb lives.178 The contemporary jahiliyya society was too pervasive to combat with 
mere political and social mobilization; rather, true believers must fully comprehend Islam’s 
totality and violently confront jahiliyya and its arbiters. In this sense, it was the duty of all 
true Muslims to fight against the ignorant forces of the state to institute the proper order of 
Islam within society. In practical terms, Qutb’s writings in Signposts indicate the formation 
of an Islamic vanguard, which he refers to as the talia’, who will lead the Islamic revival 
with two main goals: bringing the message of Islam to previously so-called Islamic 
societies and confronting and systemically altering the contemporary institutions, 
leadership, and ordering of jahiliyya society.179 
The idea of Jihad, or holy war, is a central tenet of Qutb’s writing and stands as the 
moral and religious duty of Muslims when fighting against jahiliyya society.180 Jihad, in 
Qutb’s eyes, was part and parcel of Quranic verse and practiced by the first generations of 
Muslims living during the time of Muhammad.181 Thus, as Islam was envisioned as a 
totality or system of ordering civilization, Jihad was seen as a divine tool or method used 
to address the totality of issues facing Muslims. Qutb writes that in the contest with 
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jahiliyya society, Muslims must wage personal Jihad against false teachings of non-Islamic 
origins and challenge governments, leaders, and institutions with no basis in Quranic 
verse.182 Mere words, Qutb argues, are neither enough to advance the Islamic movement 
nor dislodge jahiliyya’s manifestations from the world.183 Thus, the Islamic movement 
must logically resort to the sword to exorcise the shirk and jahiliyya that permeate 
civilization.184 From this, it is clear that the contemporary regimes throughout the Islamic 
world—or formerly Islamic world, as Qutb would qualify—should be challenged and 
removed by force. Egypt’s government, led by Nasser and the Free Officers, was the 
primary jahiliyya target that Qutb sought to eliminate. Furthermore, Qutb’s argument 
regarding Jihad and his polemical fight against the Egyptian state framed the discourse in 
which declaring someone as an apostate (takfir) and committing violent acts against other 
Muslims was acceptable Islamic behavior.  
“Whoso judges not according to what God sent down, they are the unbelievers” is 
a Quranic verse quoted by Qutb in Signposts to justify violent acts against those he deems 
ignorant and the declaration of unbelief against those living under governments of 
ignorance.185 Thus, everything within the confines of jahiliyya is stained with unbelief and 
shirk to include the entirety of society, leaders, and above all, the majority of Muslims.186 
This systemic transference of unbelief permits Qutb’s vanguard not merely to permit the 
waging of war against other Muslims but rather making violence against other Muslims 
and Muslim leaders obligatory.  
To further fortify the violence and actions he was advocating, Qutb re-introduced 
the conception of the Muslim nation—dar al-harb (abode of war) and dar al-Islam (abode 
of Islam)—to classify contemporary Muslim societies as outside of the true Islamic fray 
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and justify the use of violence against other Muslims.187 The binary classification of the 
abode of war and the abode of Islam flows from classical Islamic scholarship that 
traditionally defines both as the place where the enemies of Islam rule and war is permitted 
and “where the Muslim state is established, where God’s law is enforced.”188 It follows 
then that modern Muslim societies are within the domain of war as they fail to live by 
God’s law. Therefore, for the Muslim vanguard, war is an acceptable and the primary 
mechanism for the transition to Islam’s abode.  
In comparing the neo-Kharijite Muslim Brotherhood to the original Kharijites, we 
gain a greater understanding of how a single word masks the complexity of a movement 
and disguises the contemporary factors in which both phenomena exist. At the surface, the 
existence of the Muslim Brotherhood—their behavior and doctrine—are indicative of the 
scourge of Kharijism foretold by al-Shahrastani almost a millennium earlier. However, a 
scrutinized review of the Muslim Brotherhood and the original Kharijites reveals the power 
of a single term or idea to mask the diversity of religious, economic, and political forces of 
the day and the ability of a single person or institution to do so.  
To respond to Qutb’s manifestos, it would take a different form of expertise, one 
imbued with authority, knowledge, and Islamic credentials, to directly connect the 
Kharijites of early Islam to their contemporary manifestation. Nasser and the Egyptian 
regime neither possessed the religious currency nor expertise required for such an 
undertaking.189 By bringing al-Azhar under the control of the state with its publications 
and widespread outreach, the state marshaled the arsenal of orthodoxy and the requisite 
religious bonafides to construct the identity of the Muslim Brothers in the image of the 
master Kharijite narrative.  
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F. THE KHARIJITE DISCOURSE: STATE, PUBLIC, AND ISLAMIC 
PROPAGANDA 
Following the banning of the Muslim Brotherhood and the prosecution of Qutb and 
other members of the society, the Egyptian government began its campaign to brand the 
Muslim Brotherhood with the curse of the term Kharijite through government-produced 
publications, state-owned media outlets, and most importantly, the credentialed ulema of 
al-Azhar. Though the master narrative was not immediately deployed in its full form 
against the Brotherhood, the Egyptian government crafted a mixed media campaign that 
constructed the Muslim Brotherhood as the modern incarnation of the Kharijites—weaving 
into the ancient tale terms and imagery that modernized and contextualized the Kharijite 
phenomenon for its use in the twentieth century.190 In doing so, terms such as “terrorist” 
and “anarchists” were intertwined with “heterodoxy” and “apostates” to create a robust 
characterization of all members of the Brotherhood—not just Qutb and his co-
conspirators—whose religious, political, and secular meanings were easily understood by 
all Egyptians.191 Therefore, the government’s narrative of the Brotherhood as “Neo-
Kharijites” resonated with disparate Egyptian audiences and conferred a broad Islamo-
political legitimacy upon the regime of the Free Officers, all while demonizing the whole 
of the Brotherhood.  
1. The Official Review of Signposts along the Road: The Society of 
Brothers as Kharijites 
The primary religious rebuke of the Brotherhood came in the form of an official 
review of Signposts along the Road by Sheikh’ Abd al-Latif Sibki in Minbar al-Islam—
the monthly publication of The Supreme Council on Islamic Affairs.192 In his review, 
Sheikh Sibki uses select passages from Signposts and other works of Qutb to directly draw 
detailed and sometimes explicit comparisons between the Brotherhood and the Kharijites. 
Though Minbar al-Islam was consumed by religious audiences, Sheikh Sibki crafted his 
modern master Kharijite narrative in an accessible and evocative manner. As Kenney notes, 
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the edition of Minbar al-Islam, where Sheikh Sibke’s review was published, depicted a 
book engulfed in flames adjacent to a horned, devilish creature bearing a trident with the 
subtitle “the constitution of the depraved brothers.”193 To anyone with little knowledge of 
the article’s content or the Muslim Brotherhood, the insinuations are made clear. 
Sheikh Sibke begins with a warning to readers of the purportedly nefarious version 
of Islam portrayed by Qutb and warns against Muslims becoming intoxicated by the words 
of the Brotherhood’s seminal text. He follows his introduction with a rebuttal of Qutb’s 
interpretation of jahiliyya and hakamiyya: the first to reassure the reader that contemporary 
Egyptian society and the regime of Nasser was thoroughly Islamic and thus sufficient to 
govern; and the second, to introduce the roots of the Kharijites narrative and “words spoken 
by the Kharijites of old.”194 Sheikh Sibke draws the reader’s attention to the Kharijite 
shibboleth of “there is no judgment but God’s” and the appearance of it and related 
passages within Signposts and a common refrain of Muslim Brothers.  
Stepping through Signposts, Sheikh Sibke notes the discord and violence caused by 
the Kharijites, a direct comparison to the Kharijite’s involvement in the first Islamic civil 
war.195 He emphasizes the violent and rebellious nature of the Brotherhood and the 
Kharijites, citing the Kharijites’ secession from ‘Ali’s camp, or as the Sheikh deftly 
characterizes the event in contemporary terms—Muslims must obey the sovereignty of the 
ruler. By invoking the story of ‘Ali, Sibke connects the anecdote of ‘Ali with that of Nasser, 
two rightful Islamic leaders embattled by those who are uncompromising, dangerous, and 
seek the destruction of Islamic society.196 The Kharijites, and thus the Muslim 
Brotherhood, contributed to the disorder of society by rebelling against the rightful ruler in 
the name of an exclusionary and extreme form of Islam.  
Sheikh Sibke’s analysis of Signposts is a tale of two Islams: the traditional Islam 
propagated by official Islam and the exclusive, violent, and twisted Islam put forth by the 
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Neo-Kharijites. By recalling the Kharijite metaphor—one that is well-worn and indexed 
within the early history of Islam—Sibke, official Islam, and the Egyptian state chose a 
caustic metaphor to combat the Muslim Brotherhood. By doing so, they, in effect, created 
a religiously encoded bogeyman to achieve their political ends. Nasser and the regime of 
the Free Officers were the rightful rulers of Egypt, legitimized by the Islamic tethers of the 
Four Rightly Guided Caliphs of Islamic antiquity and imbued with the support of the 
Islamic arbiter of Al-Azhar. Sibke’s normative judgments, based in the language of the 
Islamic lexicon, are arguments that crystalize the issues confronting Egyptian society in 
the mid-1960s and the religio-political nexus of legitimacy, stability, and political power.  
Although Sibke does not advocate for the particular policies and programs of 
Nasser and his regime, he tacitly signals his approval of the regime and its efforts through 
a religious discourse abridged by contemporary concepts. As discussed previously, during 
Nasser’s rule, the traditional relationship between Islamic religious institutions and secular 
rulers was expunged; Al-Azhar, after its reform, was heavily run and influenced by the 
state and its leadership. Islam, in the view of al-Azhar, “placed limits on religious and 
political dissent, [and] the means one can use to change the religious and political status 
quo.”197 Sibke religiously sanctions Nasser’s limitations and persecution of the 
Brotherhood; however, Sibke is signaling much more than this single event: Sibke is 
codifying control of political, religious, and social speech the government emanating from 
any group or person, not strictly the Brotherhood. In a different passage, Sibke concedes 
that secular law must exist in the modern world to mitigate the gaps in legal and religious 
matters not covered by Sharia.198 Again, Sibke grants the religious seal of approval to 
Nasser’s secular efforts of modernization and reforms within Egypt, all while dismissing 
the calls of Islamists seeking Sharia as the sole legal structure. Beyond Sibke’s official 
review of Signposts, the government further co-opted official Islam in their religious 
propaganda campaign to marginalize the Muslim Brotherhood. 
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2. Popular Media and the Priming of the Egyptian People: Violence and 
Disruption 
Using much of the same rhetoric and imagery used by Sheikh Sibke in his rebuke 
of Qutb’s writings, state media outlets and the Egyptian press presented the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a monolithic group with violent and destabilizing tendencies. To reach the 
panoply of audiences within Egypt, publications concerning the Brotherhood ranged from 
simple images and caricatures of violence and fundamentalist behavior to a detailed 
interview with the Sheikh of al-Azhar, Hasan Ma’mun, in prominent publications.  
Outlets like Akhir Saʻa (Final Hour) and al-Ahram (The Pyramids) consistently 
provided negative accounts of the Brotherhood in line with state and official religious 
publications. The first pieces covering the Muslim Brotherhood addressed the arrests of 
Qutb and other prominent brothers, focusing on the danger the Society posed to Egypt.199 
A detailed account of the raid, along with images of weapons caches and extremist 
literature, was spread across the front cover over many publications, particularly those 
promulgated by Akhir Saʻa.200 In one account, the author juxtaposes his original 
assignment of reporting on “smiling children” with the Muslim Brotherhood’s plot to 
assassinate Nasser and disrupt Egyptian society.201 The author credits the Egyptian people 
with the downfall (banning) of the Brotherhood and the defense of the revolution. This 
piece and many others like it attempted to achieve its objectives: first, elicit a visceral 
response from the readership; and second, and construct a sense of ingroup (those 
supporting Nasser and the revolution) and an outgroup (the Muslim Brotherhood and other 
Islamist). By achieving their first goal, the state and its institutional agents create a 
persistent environment where Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood are threats to both 
society and “smiling children.”202 The second solidifies a state-constructed idea of 
community or citizenry under the umbrella protection of the Egyptian State; this then 
requires the state to respond to aberrant and violent behavior that threatens the collective 
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citizenry. By transgressing the purported norms of Islamic behavior, the government was 
required to take action to mitigate the activities of the Brotherhood. Said differently, under 
Weber’s definition of a state and the normative judgment of al-Azhar, Nasser and the 
Egyptian government were permitted to legitimately use force to suppress the Brotherhood. 
The negative characterization of the Brotherhood in Egyptian publications effectively 
primed the Egyptian people to feel suspicious and wary of the group that would easily 
allow the allegory of the Kharijites to be invoked.  
3. Arab Nationalism and the Modern Egyptian Citizenry 
Thus far, we have seen that the use of the master Kharijite narrative by Nasser and 
official Islam in the mid-1960s served to minimize the Brotherhood’s power and strengthen 
the Weberian legitimacy of the newly formed Egyptian nation-state. The terms use and 
religio-political stickiness reached its apex in modern Egypt’s political discourse by the 
early 1970s and, to a limited degree, created the anti-model identity of the Kharijites in a 
highly harmful, essentialist, anti-state, and stability mold. However, the implications of the 
terms had far more profound consequences for social and political life within Egypt. 
First, the outgroup characterization of the Kharijites lent Islamic credentials to the 
Arab Nationalism Nasser was pushing in Egypt. Kharijites were not only a theme of Islamic 
civilization but, rather, were the domestic incarnation of the evils that had plagued Egypt 
in the last two centuries. Imperialism, capitalism, Zionism, Marxism, and the Egyptian 
monarchy, along with Kharijism, were all masks worn by a single, evil actor attempting to 
prevent the independence, modernization, and prosperity of Egypt.203 Thus, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, as cast in the role of modern or neo-Kharijites, was a domestic agent of the 
same conspiracy against modern Egypt, Nasser and his vision of a secular Arab state. 
However, by associating the phenomenon of the neo-Kharijite Brotherhood with modern 
concepts such as Imperialism and Zionism, the collective identity of the grouping imbued 
the regime of the Free Officers with religious, secular, and political legitimacy required to 
rule Modern Egypt. Said differently, the Islamic nature of the term Kharijite and the 
prescriptive action to be taken against those deemed Kharijites—a remedy of death and 
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elimination derived from the Quran, Hadith, and codified by medieval Islamic scholars—
gave Nasser the “legitimacy” referred to in Weber’s definition of a state.  
Second, the identity of Egyptians as both Muslims and citizens of a nation-state 
was framed in the same manner in which medieval Islamic scholars framed Kharijites in 
the first few centuries of Islam: those who rebelled against the rightful leaders and those 
who obeyed; injecting this Islamic allegory gave Nasser and his regime the support of the 
established religious class and those Egyptians who view the world through the Islamic 
idiom. Throughout the 1960s and 70s, the scholars of al-Azhar continued the role of their 
medieval counterparts by injecting religious verse into the politicking of the modern state, 
often citing “that a Muslim is in compliance with his religion and nationality unless he 
rebels against the community, or he cooperates with the enemies of Islam and the 
homeland, or he commits crimes against anyone whether Muslim or not.”204 In this case, 
Nasser is cast as the Caliph ‘Ali and the Muslim Brotherhood as the Kharijites of old. In 
the same casting, Egyptian citizens and good Muslims needed to accept Nasser as Egypt’s 
rightful ruler. The revolution of the Free Officers, with the blessing of al-Azhar, is more 
similar than not to medieval scholars conferring political and religious legitimacy on the 
upstart Abbasid Caliphate. 
Though the use of the Kharijite narrative in modern Egypt was widespread during 
the regimes of the Free Officers, the Egyptian state forced the narrative upon an ill-fitting 
and outdated, classical model that disguised the social, economic, and political woes 
underpinning modern Egypt. In framing the Brotherhood into a simplistic, essentialist, and 
characteristically binary framework, the Egyptian state failed to understand and address 
the systemic issues that were perpetually destabilizing and driving Egyptian youth toward 
the Muslim Brotherhood and far more violent groups. Under future Egyptian regimes, the 
complexity of factors contributing to violent extremism and political instability would 
become more commonplace; a more nuanced perspective concerning Islamism, Kharijism, 
and the government’s failure to address the root problems that caused such extremism in 
religion would dominate the discourse. 
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G. THE ERA OF SADAT AND MUBARAK: REFLECTION AND 
CHANGING THOUGHT 
The use of the term Kharijite in the 1950s and 60s represented a state-controlled, 
one-sided argument that delegitimized both violent and non-violent Islamist groups and 
credentialed state authorities with a mélange of Islamic and Weberian legitimacy; however, 
the presidencies of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak were marked by the relative 
expansion of Egyptian civil society, a loosening of government control on religious and 
public institutions, and a rapprochement with Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Though the use of Kharijism by the government against those perceived as destabilizing 
the progression of Egypt continued, often violently, through to the 2000s, the government’s 
relaxed grip on economic, religious, and social discourse provided an opening for greater 
understanding of violent Islamism and the societal conditions leading to its propagation. 
The opening also permitted a realignment and partitioning of Islamist groups, notably 
concerning a group’s advocacy of violence to achieve its goals, creating space for a 
politically acceptable Islamist opposition.205 While this period represents a continuity of 
the sinusoidal nature in the state’s approach toward Islamists—ranging from marginal 
acceptance to violent repression—the shibboleth of Kharijism in its modern incantation 
evolved beyond the simplistic discourse of the 1960s and 70s. The complexity and depth 
of understanding concerning the charge of neo-Kharijite evolved into a far more complex 
discourse concerning the failures of the state to provide public goods, the “boundaries of 
Islamist opposition [,] and the nature of the Islamic polity.”206 However, the employment 
of the term by Sadat and Mubarak continued in much the same way as under Nasser, but 
in a targeted way that sanctioned the legitimate use of violence against outgroups charged 
as being Kharijites.  
When the generally unknown Anwar Sadat became President in 1970, he inherited 
an Egypt reeling from a catastrophic war loss that had sent the country into a cultural, 
social, and economic spiral. The dramatic loss suffered by Egypt and Arab nationalism at 
the hands of Israel in the June 1967 War had far-reaching implications for the Egyptian 
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state and the system it advanced.207 To ameliorate the discord and chaos of the war’s 
aftermath, Nasser and later Sadat, embraced the Islamist forces they had once oppressed.208 
Only a year into his presidency, Sadat put forth a series of reforms to correct 
deficiencies in Nasser’s revolution. He purged Nasser loyalists from the political ranks, 
released jailed members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and other groups deemed political 
opponents of Nasser; Sadat saw the Brotherhood as victims of “corrupt government 
officials.”209 Though seemingly sympathetic to the plight of the Brotherhood, Sadat saw 
the Islamist movement as an avenue to balance the political forces of his regime and 
increase his base as the “believing president.”210 However, unbeknownst to Sadat and his 
government, the Islamist movement of the Muslim Brotherhood was no longer a single 
movement—if it ever was; rather it was a smattering of Islamist groups ranging from the 
reformist Brothers to the violent, revisionists of Takfir wal-Hijra, Jama’at Islamia, and 
Islamic Jihad.  
The Islamist factions that emerged following the relaxation of political controls 
under Sadat fell into one of two camps: one which followed the reformist and moderate 
ideology of Hasan Isma’il al-Hudaybi; and the other adherents to the Qutbian-based 
ideology of violent Jihad. Though al-Hudaybi’s writings and the so-called prison debates 
of the 1960s and 70s will be discussed at length in the next chapter—notably for al-
Hudaybi’s and other non-state actors adoption of the use of the term Kharijite as a rhetorical 
and somewhat moderating device—a summary of the primary division between the groups 
is warranted.211 Most Islamists groups held that Egypt was in a state of jahiliyya; however, 
both camps advocated radically different remedies to this issue: peaceful activism or 
violent Jihad. This fundamental difference solidified the divide between the various 
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factions and came to define acceptable Islamist opposition of al-Hudaybi in the eyes of 
Sadat and Mubarak’s government.212  
Al-Hudaybi and his moderate, reformist Muslim Brotherhood staked a position 
between that of the Egyptian state and groups like Takfir. The middle-of-the-road approach 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in the mid-1970s avoided the views which garnered its 
oppression under Nasser and thus, allowed limited political representation and the rejoinder 
of Islamism into the political discourse of Egypt.213 By recognizing the regime of Sadat as 
legitimate and those wishing to overthrow it as anti-state, heretical rebels, the Muslim 
Brotherhood positioned itself between groups like Takfir and the government. However, 
within the binary debate of Kharijism, the Brothers temporarily sided with the state. This 
pseudo-grey area of existence allowed the Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations to 
capitalize on the destructive outcomes of Sadat’s economic liberalization. Sadat’s “open-
door” economic policy significantly reduced the social safety provisions the state had 
previously provided; the Brotherhood stepped in throughout the 1970s and beyond to 
provide public goods, utilities, and services.214 As state by Dinna al Raffie, “as long as the 
activism was restricted to the areas in which they operated and did not cross the threshold 
of violence against the state and its interests,” the existence and operations of Islamist 
groups were tolerated.215  
1. Kharijite Redux  
By including moderate Islamists within the construct of the Egyptian state, Sadat 
believed that the deliberative political process he was creating through relaxation and 
liberalization would have a moderating effect on all like-groups.216 While this was true for 
a fraction of Islamist organizations who promoted acceptable opposition in the state’s eyes, 
the anti-secular, anti-state principles and violent tendencies of many Islamist groups 
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continued throughout Sadat and Mubarak’s presidencies. Moreover, the epithet of 
Kharijite, beyond the discourse of Nasser and its later moderating employment by Hudaybi, 
remained the religiously legitimizing force permitting the Egyptian government to 
perpetrate violence against outgroups deemed Kharijites by the state, official Islam, and 
now, moderate Islamist groups.  
The terrorist and violent Islamist organizations of the Mubarak and Sadat eras—
notably dominated by the Technical Military Academy group (Jama’at al-Fanniya al-
’Askariya), the Excommunication and Emigration group (Takfir), the Jihad organization, 
and Jund Allah—behaved in a manner more consistent with the original Kharijites. While 
they exhibited minor differences in doctrine, the act of takfir (declaring a Muslim an 
unbeliever), the belief in contemporary jahiliyya, and the use of force to overthrow leaders 
considered un-Islamic garnered the groups a monolithic character with little distinction or 
separation. However, no group encapsulated the ideation of neo-Kharijite as dramatically 
as Takfir. 
The Takfir group emerged from the prison debates of the 1960s as one of the many 
radical Islamist factions that splintered from the Muslim Brotherhood. Shukri Mustafa, the 
founder of Takfir, advocated that faithful adherents to Islam were required to physically 
separate themselves from jahiliyya society and based such a requirement on Muhammed’s 
hijra (emigration) from Mecca to Medina. By doing so, members would be untainted by 
the shirk and sin of jahiliyya society; those who chose not to emigrate were declared 
unbelievers and subject to retribution.217 In 1973, Mustafa and his fellow Takfir members 
left for a secluded region outside of Minya, Egypt, in order to create the abode of Islam 
separate from the rest of jahiliyya society.218 After repeated clashes with authorities near 
Minya and elsewhere, its members were arrested and later imprisoned. Coupled with the 
actions of the Technical Military Academy group, which attempted to infiltrate the Military 
Academy and bring down the regime of Sadat and the assassination of Husayn al-Dahaybi, 
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Takfir garnered a strong rebuke from the clerics of al-Azhar and a harsh clampdown by the 
state219…a cycle that would repeat itself to varying degrees to present day. 
The response of the state and official Islam to Takfir is best exemplified in 
publications like Firebrands from the Divine Guidance of Islam and Deviant Trends in the 
Interpretation of the Qur’an, two Azhari essays that attempted to refute violent Islamist 
actions which were viewed as destabilizing to Islamic society and the state.220 Different 
from the Nasser era, al-Azhar of the Sadat and Mubarak era displayed “a degree of 
independent religious thinking.”221 Sadat’s deregulation of al-Azhar altered how the 
scholars of al-Azhar discussed the charge of Kharijism; acts of the Kharijites—religiously 
motivated violence, assassinations, and takfir—were not merely affronts to the nation-
state, but attacks on the Islamic moral order. Modern Kharijites were “traitors to Islam and 
Muslim society,” not the modern Egyptian state.222 Though distinct from the 
pronouncements of Kharijism from the Nasser era, the lines between state and religious 
institutions and outlets blurred the moral and civic objections to the Kharijites, who often 
used the terms criminal, terrorist, and Kharijite interchangeably.223 Though state control 
over religious institutions and official Islam was less than under Nasser, religious 
denunciation and the invocation of the Master Kharijite narrative, by its very nature, takes 
a side. In the early years of Islam, the designation of Kharijite relegated a group or 
individual as an enemy of the state and Islam. Thus, the master Kharijite narrative invoked 
by al-Azhar necessitated state action against Takfir and other groups in the late 1970s.  
Sadat’s condemnation and subsequent crackdown on Islamist groups like Takfir 
continued the cyclical pattern of Islamism’s relationship with official Islam and state 
authorities. This pattern of repression and rapprochement percolated through the remainder 
of Sadat’s tenure and throughout Mubarak’s presidency. Sadat’s assassination in 1981 at 
 
219 Kenney, 126. 
220 Kenney, 127. 
221 al-Ahram, 8 July 1977, Ruz al-Yusuf, 29 August 1977; October, 28 August. Cited in Kenney, Muslim Rebels, 
131. 
222 Kenney, Muslim Rebels, 131. 
223 Kenney, 131. 
62 
the hands of the Jihad Organization marked another episode in the cycle (or recycle) of the 
Kharijites and the state, prompting further crackdowns and the marshaling of the Islamic 
idiom to reinforce the legitimacy of the power of the state and monopolize violence within 
the bounds of Egypt.224 Though the official line from the state and al-Azhar may have 
pushed the same Kharijite narrative, the Egyptian peoples’ understanding and response to 
Islamic extremism evolved based on an understanding of contemporary Egyptian society 
and greater knowledge of violent extremism. As Kenney notes:  
This shift in anti-extremist politics was brought about by historical 
experience and self-criticism, the culmination of a learning process in which 
Egyptians came to realize that state authoritarianism and Islamist violence 
were intertwined elements of the same political culture and that social and 
economic problems contributed directly to the extremist trend.225 
The repeated recollection of the Kharijite narrative failed to blunt Islamist violence and 
rebellion against the Egyptian state. Hosni Mubarak, like Sadat and Nasser, confronted re-
imagined Islamist groups that followed in the image of the extremist elements of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Takfir wal-Hijra, and the Jihad Organizations and again, like his 
predecessors, continued to use the image of the Kharijites as justification for the use of 
violence against such groups.226 
Additionally, moderate Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
reformed faction, had infiltrated Egyptian society, providing state functions and services 
where the state could not, and oftentimes, refused to make good on the promises of a 
modernized Egypt. Aware of previous experiences with extremism and modernizations, 
the Egyptian people viewed the neo-Kharijites of the 1990s and early 2000s as symptoms 
of a larger subset of problems: the haphazard formation of the modern nation-state; the 
stagnation of the Egyptian economy; the lack of opportunity promised by the revolution 
and its subsequent regimes; and the dearth of political legitimacy, popular or otherwise, 
which the government claimed. The Free Officers’ continued invocation of the Kharijite 
narrative epitomized the failures of the Egyptian regime to consolidate an ideology or 
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political legitimacy, opting rather to contrive its legitimacy through an Islamic allegory—
a concept antithetical to the secular regime who wielded such a device. Such contradictions 
and failures of the state ultimately contributed to the growing call for popular determination 
and the events of the 2011 Arab Spring. 
H. CONCLUSION: THE ARAB SPRING, THE REGIME OF AL-SISI AND 
THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE NEO-KHARIJITES 
The promise of democracy and political change in Egypt following the 2011 Arab 
Spring uprising ushered in an age in which the popular and political legitimacy sought by 
the regimes of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak was finally at hand, but wielding such 
legitimacy would be the Muslim Brotherhood under the Freedom and Justice Party. The 
neo-Kharijites of the twentieth century were now the arbiters of state authority, with the 
popular backing to execute their Islamist vision of Egypt; however, this was not to be. After 
a short tenure, “popular forces” backed by the deep state ousted democratically elected 
Mohammed Morsi as President in a coup d’état, installing General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi as 
President.227 Not long after coming to power, the specter of Kharijism re-emerged after its 
dormancy following the 2011 Arab Spring. The Muslim Brotherhood was banned from the 
Egyptian political scene and labeled as a terrorist organization, earning the tried-and-true 
title of Kharijites.228  
The resurgent image of the Muslim Brotherhood as neo-Kharijites has only 
escalated with the rise of the Islamic State, with the Egyptian state, al-Azhar, and media 
outlets conflating the Muslim Brotherhood with the likes of the Islamic State.229 The 
oversimplification and binary characterization of Islamist movements ranging from the 
Brotherhood to the Islamic State—under the guise of Kharijism—is not a new anti-
terrorism policy of Sisi’s regime; rather, as this chapter has argued, the themes of the master 
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Kharijite narrative are cyclical, selectively recall the Islamic idiom to imbue the 
revolutionary regime with Islamic legitimacy and suppress Islamist groups using violent 
methods. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic State are again cast in the same 
mold of the Kharijites and are dealt with in the fashion as ‘Ali, the Umayyads, and the 
Abbasids. In the case of the Brotherhood and al-Sisi, the re-emergence of the Kharijite 
narrative is indicative of a weak state in search of a legitimizing ideology.  
This tendency is not limited to Egypt; rather, it pervades the gamut of Middle 
Eastern and Islamic nations that recall the well-worn symbols and language of the Kharijite 
narrative to induce a robust state response to violent Islamists and a widespread rebuke of 
behavior deemed Islamically unacceptable. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Morocco, and 
many others have used Kharijism to elicit what Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak had attempted; 
however, to date, the term masks deeper societal and religious issues that have been 





IV. NON-STATE ACTORS 
In much the same way that Egypt used the Kharijite epithet to gain political and 
religious legitimacy, non-state Islamist groups cast the Kharijite charge and, to an extent, 
the master narrative in their effort to delegitimize adversaries and opposing groups. Though 
the use of the term Kharijite by both state and non-state actors is similar, two factors 
distinguish the impact of the term’s use: the user’s identity and the context in which it is 
employed. When considering both factors, the outcome of using the term varies only 
slightly based on the context; it remains that the group invoking the charge of Kharijism 
and the master narrative intend to characterize their existence and interests as religiously 
and politically legitimate. When invoked by Islamists groups operating within the political 
bounds of the modern state, Islamists using the term establish themselves as religiously 
and politically palatable or acceptable, often demonizing their more extreme Islamist 
cousins as Kharijites and reinforcing the state’s claims of legitimacy and use of violent 
force against out-group Islamists. When used by Islamist groups that operate outside of a 
normalized state context, accusing opponents of being a Kharijite operates similarly with 
more religious overtones: it marks the group as the sole champion of true Islam, deeming 
all others as heterodox and unbelievers. Though the lack of a state alters the extent and 
overall utility of the term Kharijite due to the argued original purpose of the master 
narrative, the use of the term Kharijite by Islamist groups demonstrates the power of the 
Islamic idiom and the use of well-worn and weaponized narratives to bestow political and 
religious validity.  
This chapter will explore the writings of two notable Islamists who invoke the 
Kharijite narrative—Hasan Isma’il al-Hudaybi of the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar-
based Yusuf al-Qaradawi—followed by an accounting of notable instances in which 
Islamist organizations wielded the charge of Kharijism against other Islamists.  
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A. KHARIJITES AMONG US: HASAN ISMA’IL AL-HUDAYBI AND THE 
REFORMED BROTHERHOOD 
As covered in the previous chapter, Kharijism and the political and religious 
discourse surrounding Islamist movements and their relationship vis-à-vis the state figured 
prominently, if not centrally, in Egypt after the revolution of the Free Officers in 1952. 
Among the many political, social, and religious dialogues that occurred in the formative 
phases of modern Egypt, the prison debates—a phenomenon characterized by dialogue 
between a spectrum of moderate and hardline imprisoned Islamists concerning the future 
of the Brotherhood230—generated numerous treatises and manifestos. The prison debates 
and the fissures exposed by ideological opponents demonstrated the emerging 
heterogeneous composition of the Islamist movement.231 Though Sayyid Qutb emerged as 
the most prominent of the prison authors, notably for his extremist tendencies and mujahid 
tone, Hasan Isma’il al-Hudaybi, the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood following 
the death of Hassan al-Banna, represented the moderate incarnation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, one that promoted working within the construct of the state to advance the 
causes of Islam and the Brotherhood. Al-Hudaybi’s vision, in contrast with that of Qutb 
and other radicals, eschewed the exclusivist, austere, and often extremist interpretation of 
Islam offered by the more radical members of the Brotherhood that initially garnered the 
group the title of Neo-Kharijite.232 Rather, al-Hudaybi offered a pluralistic and reformist 
rebuke of Qutb’s manifesto by casting Qutb and the extremist Islamist movement in the 
role of the Kharijites. This is remarkable as al-Hudaybi and his fellow brothers had been 
deemed neo-Kharijites by the state just over a decade earlier. 
Al-Hudaybi’s seminal work, Preachers…Not Judges, was the first in a series of 
moderate Islamist literature that advanced the reformist principles by countering the 
foundation of Qutb’s writings and invoking the master Kharijite narrative. Though al-
Hudaybi does not directly apply the label of Kharijite to Qutb—Qutb remained a revered 
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figure within the Brotherhood after his execution—the parallels drawn by Hudaybi are 
unmistakable.233 Since joining the Brotherhood in 1947, Al-Hudaybi was exceedingly 
aware of the moderate-extremist tensions within the Brotherhood. As Supreme Guide, he 
was unable to reconcile the desires of the more militant members, many of whom were 
members of the Secret Apparatus, with those of the moderates; the failure at reconciliation 
to do so fostered an environment in which the 1954 assassination attempt on Nasser and 
the conspiracy of 1965 effectively eliminated the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Hudaybi as 
political and religious actors. Furthermore, the subsequent charge of Kharijism leveled 
against the Brotherhood for their violent tendencies, in Al-Hudaybi’s opinion, threatened 
to derail the Islamist agenda and malign the movement overall.234 Under these 
circumstances, Al-Hudaybi attempted to set a new direction for the Brotherhood; his 
apologia recycled the Kharijite narrative to place most of the moderate Brotherhood within 
the norms of modern Egypt and condemned the radical factions of the Brotherhood as neo-
Kharijites. Al-Hudaybi frames his thesis in his title; the Muslim Brotherhood should 
advocate and advance Islam, rather than exact judgment against those deemed unbelievers, 
heterodox, or polytheists…for anyone who utters the confession is “consider [ed] a 
Muslim…and [the Brotherhood] has no right to examine the extent of the truthfulness of 
his confession.”235 Al-Hudaybi also rebutted a foundational tenet of Qutb’s thesis by 
defining jahiliyya as a historical age rather than a condition in which humans do not adhere 
to proper Islamic behavior and belief.236 
Al-Hudaybi warned against judging the sins of others, and particularly, the sins of 
a leader viewed as un-Islamic, stating that any violent action taken against the leader 
usurped the judgment of God and amounted to internal discord.237 Muslims who judged 
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the since of others on earth and acted to enact punishment for those sins—usually in the 
form of targeted killings—were considered Kharijites and unworthy of membership in 
Islamic society, the Brotherhood, and the functions of the state. Providing a contrasting 
definition of Islamic belief, jahiliyya, and judgment of sin, Al-Hudaybi cast extremist and 
violent Islamists as Kharijites.  
Though Preachers is primarily focused on the religious aspect of the proper 
conduct of Muslims and members of the Brotherhood at large, the impetus behind Al-
Hudaybi’s challenge to Qutb is squarely based in the realm of the political.238 Al-Hudaybi 
viscerally understood the power the state wielded when invoking Islamic cultural 
narratives, particularly the heresiographical polemics of the master Kharijite narrative, 
against the Muslim Brotherhood and the burgeoning Islamist movement.239 To achieve a 
future for Egypt remotely akin to the vision of many Islamists, Al-Hudaybi offered a 
reformist narrative to the Islamist agenda and demonized the violent wing of the 
Brotherhood as neo-Kharijites. In doing so, he placed the moderate Islamists squarely 
within the state’s camp, siding with Nasser and the Caliph ‘Ali and opposing the rebellious 
factions that attempted to tear the fabric of Egyptian society apart, just as the early 
Kharijites threatened early Islamic society. Al-Hudaybi, through the imagery of the 
Kharijites, not only attempted to legitimize the positions of the modern Brothers but 
grounded their existence and survival as a group within the confines of acceptable Islamic 
behavior.240 It telegraphed to the state that adherents to the moderate Islamist cause 
warranted inclusion within Egyptian society; Nasser and his successors were not labeled 
apostates, and in return, members of the Brotherhood who demonstrated peaceful 
opposition to the state should not be considered Kharijites and did not require the violent 
response of the state.241  Thus, the reappropriation of the Kharijite shibboleth, Al-Hudaybi 
hoped, would ensure the future of the Muslim Brotherhood politically and permit the group 
to exist as loyal opposition to the Egyptian state. Al-Hudaybi’s moderate manifesto 
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signaled to Nasser’s regime its willingness to operate within the construct of the modern 
Egyptian state set forth by the Free Officers.  
While some of his fellow Brothers labeled Preachers as a complete concession to 
the state and an abandonment of the Brotherhood’s ideals, by using the Kharijite narrative, 
Al-Hudaybi found ways to minimize his tacit support of all Al-Azhar and the state. By 
decrying all judgments of faith, al-Hudaybi also negated the favorable judgments issued 
by Al-Azhar in favor of the state.242 In advising Brothers to avoid passing judgment upon 
leaders viewed as tyrants—disavowing the practice of takfir and the killing of said 
leaders—it appears al-Al-Hudaybi only buttresses the case of the state against the 
Brotherhood; however, al-Hudaybi cleverly notes that members of the Islamic community 
should defer judgment of those deemed to be devout and practicing Muslims.243 Therefore, 
by suspending judgment of all persons or institutions in question, Al-Hudaybi cleverly 
invoked the Kharijite narrative to condemn both radical Islamists and the religious 
institutions that favored the state. In this way, al-Hudaybi attempts to neuter the state’s 
ability to dominate the Islamic culture talk, and in rhetorical terms, effectively minimized 
the damage the state could inflict by using the narrative against the Brotherhood. 
In what is arguably the first modern instance of an Islamist group invoking the 
Kharijite epithet against its perceived opponents, Preachers distills the Brotherhood’s 
vision of an Islamic Egypt that accepts the existence of the modern Egyptian state and its 
leaders, all while challenging the authority of Nasser and al-Azhar in a religio-politically 
acceptable manner. The work demonstrates the realpolitik of its author, who strategically 
articulates a moderate message that operates within the state’s construct and narratives. Al-
Hudaybi’s use of the Kharijite narrative demonstrated the multiplicity of its utility as a 
weapon of secular statists and Islamists alike.244 As Al-Hudaybi surmised in Preachers, 
the religious idiom invoked by the state—that which invokes the Kharijite image—is 
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plastic and bent to meet the desire of its molder.245  Rather than allow the state to dominate 
the use of religious idioms and narratives, Al-Hudaybi manipulated the same devices to 
foster dialogue among the Muslim Brotherhood about the future of the Islamist movement 
within Egypt and partially subvert the twisting of the narrative by the state to further its 
own authority.246 The charge of Kharijism thus represented a device of the Brotherhood to 
confer the self-identity of acceptable opposition and protest while simultaneously 
delegitimizing the absolute power of the state and the politically charged violence of 
extreme Islamists. 
This instance of exploiting the narrative and charge of Kharijism describes Islamists 
who attempt to legitimize their existence within the bounds of a weak state seeking to 
consolidate its power. Similarly, the next section reviews Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s work and 
the evolution of the Kharijite narrative as it pertains to modern Islamist movements and 
their fratricidal tendencies. 
B. AL-QARADAWI: THE CAUSES OF THE KHARIJITE CONDITION 
In the case of al-Hudaybi and the Muslim Brotherhood, Preachers was written and 
interpreted in an Egyptian context; however, Hudaybi’s thesis and advocacy for a 
reformed, non-violent Islamist movement can be applied to the broader Islamic context. 
The work of Yusuf al-Qaradawi recalls the imagery and narrative of the Kharijites in a 
comprehensive yet nuanced approach that addresses the causes of what Qaradawi views as 
neo-Kharijism. Qaradawi is the Islamist scholar who has championed and cultivated the 
wasatiyya, or “centrist” form of Islamism into a school of Islamic thought. Part of its 
foundation as a school of Islamic thought seeks to “disseminate…and to constitute an 
alternative to a ‘juridical flaw’ from which, in al-Qaradawi’s opinion, the violent groups in 
Islam suffer.”247 An acolyte of both al-Azhar and the Muslim Brotherhood, Qaradawi’s 
work al-Sahwa al-islamiyya bain al-juhud wa’l-tatarruf (Islamic Awakening Between 
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Rejection and Extremism) is not only a detailed analysis of the current of violence within 
Islamist movements but a prescient primer for the modern causes of fratricidal tendencies 
among Islamist factions.248 While Qaradawi does not cast the aspersions against a specific 
group or movement, he invokes the Kharijite narrative to address what he views as the 
fundamental religious misunderstandings of violent Islamists that exhibit Kharijite-like 
behavior and the conditions—the social, economic, and political maladies of brought about 
by the secularly minded regimes of the Middle East—that nurture the extremism indicative 
of the neo-Kharijites.  
Al-Qaradawi’s scholastic and Islamist pedigrees—a graduate of al-Azhar and an 
active member of the Muslim Brotherhood—contribute to his moderate and meticulously 
crafted arguments against both violent Islamists and secular society. In his time in Egypt, 
al-Qaradawi was among the first graduates of al-Azhar to belong to both the Brotherhood 
and al-Azhar simultaneously;249 however, unlike other scholars who shed either their 
Azharite or Brotherhood credentials in favor of the other, al-Qaradawi maintained 
identities of Azharite Islamic scholar and political Islamist.250 He is noted for both extolling 
al-Azhar as “heirs of the prophets” and criticizing it for its role in legitimizing and 
executing the will of the Free Officers.251  Similarly, he often criticized Islamist movements 
for transgressions against acceptable Islamic behavior yet sympathized with their plight; 
al-Qaradawi, as a member of the Brotherhood in mid-century Egypt, was subject to 
imprisonment and torture for his beliefs and association with the Brotherhood. Thus, the 
scholastic forges of al-Azhar provide Qaradawi with the Islamic credentials to be 
authoritative on religious matters and the Brotherhood’s tribulations under the Egyptian 
Crown and Nasser with the perspective of the lay Muslim. Such a combination, in 
conjunction with his prominence, platform, and the popularity of his message gives him 
the qualifications to invoke the Kharijite narrative to condemn violent tendencies of some 
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Islamists while castigating secular society and authoritarian states for creating the 
conditions that foster neo-Kharijites.252  
In Islamic Awakening, Qaradawi juxtaposes the Kharijites of antiquity against the 
religious extremists of his time to deconstruct their misuse and perversion of Prophetic 
verse while simultaneously identifying the failings of modern, secular society as the culprit 
of their religious dereliction. Al-Qaradawi places Takfir wal-Hijra and other violent 
Islamists rhetorically adjacent to the original Kharijites without directly naming them as 
such; however, his understanding of the conditions that nurture religious extremism and 
violence is evident: 
What we actually need is the unflinching courage to admit that our youth 
have been forced to resort to what we call “religious extremism” through 
our own misdeeds ... in order to rectify this situation, we need to begin by 
reforming ourselves and our societies according to Allah’s decree before we 
can ask our youth to be calm, to show wisdom and temperance.253 
With the specter of Kharijism raised, Qaradawi describes the cause of the extremists’ 
errors. He attributes Islamist violence to the lack of religious knowledge of the populous. 
Of the many misinterpretations and mistakes he identifies, Qaradawi focuses on radical 
Islamists’ puritanical claims to be the sole arbiters of the Islamic faith, belief, and 
jurisprudence. As Hafez identifies, Qaradawi “asserts that there are two types of religious 
disagreements in Islam”; one concerning proper creed, and the other concerning 
jurisprudence.254 Such disagreements surround creed are impermissible, often resulting in 
the tumult that divides and fragments the Islamic community.255 The latter disagreement, 
that concerning jurisprudence, is one that is desired and “evidence of God’s generosity that 
He permits believers to choose between different interpretations of scripture based on their 
circumstances.”256 Thus, Qaradawi elevates the diversity of interpretive jurisprudence so 
 
252 Polka, chap. 3. Al-Qaradawi has a popular Al Jazeera program Sharia and Life has 700–800 million viewers 
worldwide. 
253 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening: Between Rejection and Extremism (International Institute of Islamic 
Thought, 2006), 17, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvkc67k3. 
254 al-Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening; cited in Hafez, “Not My Brother’s Keeper,” 203. 
255 al-Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening; cited in Hafez, “Not My Brother’s Keeper,” 203. 
256 Hafez, “Not My Brother’s Keeper,” 203. 
73 
scorned by extremists; the rigid, single-track, and puritanical interpretation of scripture by 
those he compares to the Kharijites of antiquity fail to wholly understand the plural 
interpretive structure—based on an undisputed creed—which God bestowed upon man. 
Though Qaradawi finds the particulars of the faith as sources of extremist behavior, he 
argues that cultural tensions and hollow Islamic societies are the systemic roots of 
extremism. 
Qaradawi elucidates Western society’s corrupting power and culture upon Islamic 
society, emphasizing the failure of the Islamic polity to defend against such encroachment. 
His qualm with Western and secular culture lies in its opposition to the structure and 
balance that the totality of the Islamic system had offered. The lack of the Islamic system 
and the outright suppression of Islam under the secular regimes of the Baath and Nasser 
had exposed Muslims to a whole host of visceral and lascivious phenomenon: loose 
women, the consumption of alcohol, political corruption, rampant economic inequality, 
foreign ideologies, the rise of the Zionist state, the humiliation of Muslims, and the 
undermining of the rights of Palestine.257 Islamic morality, he argues, provides an avenue 
to mitigate the contemporary tribulations and vice that confront Muslims daily; however, 
the active suppression of Islamic identity and Muslim activism “cannot be suppressed 
forever, and must eventually explode.”258 Such an explosion manifests itself in the form of 
Kharijite behavior, and as Qaradawi sympathizes, it is understandable why Islamists 
choose “to meet force with force and violence with violence.”259 In this way, Qaradawi 
invokes the taboo meme of the Kharijites in a way that attempts to explain the puzzle of 
the radical Islamist problem. Within the context of late twentieth-century Egypt, 
Qaradawi’s nuance in analyzing the neo-Kharijite condition surpasses earlier attempts to 
wield the Kharijite epithet and justify its use through oversimplified mechanisms. 
Moreover, Qaradawi’s use of the term, thus far, goes beyond the invocation of the Kharijite 
narrative in previous cases and chapters; rather than invoking the façade of Kharijism as a 
negative shibboleth to demonize Islamists advocating violence in the name of Islam, he 
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frames the social and political dialogue concerning contemporary struggles of society 
within an Islamic context. Instead of merely co-opting the image of the Kharijites to 
legitimize the moderate Islamists, as Hudaybi did, Qaradawi uses the narrative to address 
the deep and systemic causes of violent Islamist tendencies.  
In concluding his use of the Kharijite narrative, Qaradawi invokes the well-worn 
and potent allegory of the original Kharijite sin—the secession of the Kharijites from ‘Ali’s 
camp at Siffin—not to further condemn Islamists who have resorted to violence but to 
encourage Muslims to approach the issue of Islamic extremism thoughtfully.260 In this new 
twist of the tale, Qaradawi encourages Muslims to act as ‘Ali did toward the Kharijites: do 
not cast them out or deem them brothers in Islam and only use force against them as a final 
resort.261 The importance of this allusion to the Battle of Siffin in such a context cannot be 
understated. The allegory of ‘Ali and the Kharijites has been wielded as a weapon against 
those seeking to overthrow the rightful leader; from medieval scholars such as Shahrastani 
to President Sisi of Egypt. Qaradawi de-weaponizes the allegory and puts forth a different 
interpretation to force the discourse around Islamic extremism in a direction that addressed 
its purported root causes and proposed an Islamist solution. His solution, however, is a 
version of a moderate and reformed Islamism, one that sees Islam as the governing 
structure of the modern states of the Middle East. In this way, Qaradawi utilizes the 
Kharijite narrative to legitimize his vision for modern Islamic societies and states; only by 
raising peaceful opposition that promotes Islam’s reestablishment as the totality of the 
governing system and power structure can the woes of contemporary Islamic society be 
ameliorated. In this way, Qaradawi’s use of the Battle of Siffin is akin to those who have 
used it before him: a tool in which a familiar narrative communicates legitimacy and 
advances a cause or agenda.  
Aside from Qaradawi’s use of the Kharijite imagery in Islamic Awakening to 
elucidate a softer and more introspective view of Islamic extremism, his work presages the 
division and fratricidal tendencies of modern-day Islamist groups. As Hafez notes, the book 
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is significant as it “anticipates many of the issues that have divided Islamists on the 
battlefield in Algeria, Iraq, and Syria from the 1990s to the present time.”262 Qaradawi’s 
prescient words regarding Islamist infighting serves as an excellent primer to analyze the 
use of the Kharijite narrative and imagery by contemporary Islamist groups, particularly 
the Islamic State. 
C. THE ISLAMIC STATE, INFIGHTING AND THE NEO-KHARIJITES: 
BRANDING THE ENEMY   
As discussed previously, al-Qaradawi posits that it is permissible within the Islamic 
community to disagree on juridical matters concerning religious rulings and readings of 
scripture based on the specific context and conditions. Nevertheless, disagreement on the 
foundations of the Islamic creed is impermissible.263 Islamist organizations, ranging from 
the Armed Islamic Group and Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria to the Islamic State and 
al-Nusra in Syria, disagree on matters of Islamic politics and jurisprudence, often turning 
their weapons and excoriating rhetoric against each other, even when confronted with a 
shared foe, usually a state or foreign power.264 Among the epithets and deleterious 
narratives intended to harm rival groups and legitimize the cause of their own faction, the 
narrative of Kharijism figures centrally in the religiously charged rhetoric. The permissible 
and beneficial disagreement by Islamist factions over matters such as takfir, in al-
Qaradawi’s view, unfortunately, devolves into internal discord within the Islamic 
community or fitna, so well described by Qaradawi: 
One is perplexed and pained to no end when he finds some of those who 
work for Islam accuse others of being traitorous agents who are chasing 
after secularists and the enemies of Islam. They say about others: “He is an 
agent of the West or East, or to this or that regime,” simply because he 
disagrees with their opinions or some stance, or because he adopts means 
that differ from theirs.265  
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The discord Qaradawi depicted hauntingly resembles that occurred during the Syrian Civil 
War and the rise and fall of the Islamic State; the religious and political disagreements 
between members of the Islamic State and between the Islamic State and other Islamists 
groups such as al-Qaeda and al-Nusra often devolved into religious rhetorical fights in 
which the Kharijite narrative is invoked and wielded against the opposing Islamist faction. 
This section analyzes the juridic disagreements within the Islamic state, the 
disagreements between the Islamic State and rival Islamist factions, and how the master 
Kharijite narrative served as the primary rhetorical weapon to legitimize its user’s religious 
and political stance and demonize its opposition. Though this is not the only instance in 
which Salafi Jihadists or violent Islamists have delved into the rhetorical quiver of the 
Islamic lexicon to loose the curse of Kharijite, its use by and against the Islamic State is 
the most contemporary and well-documented example in which the Kharijite narrative was 
employed by those seeking to exploit the terms political and religious power. Furthermore, 
the charge of Kharijite, the Islamic infighting against rival factions, and the level of 
religiously motivated violence carried out by the Islamic State are arguably most 
identifiable with the Kharijites (and more specifically, the Azariqa) of antiquity. 
From the Grand Nuri Mosque in Mosul, Iraq, on June 29th, 2014, Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi declared the foundation of a Caliphate from Western Syria to Northeastern Iraq. 
Resurrecting the caliphate after 90 years of suspense,266 Baghdadi and his cohort 
established a state based on the totality of Islam as its foundation. The Islamic State group 
initially emerged in 2004 as an offshoot of the tattered al-Qaeda of Iraq by Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi.267 Over the next decade, its form and success oscillated until it emerged as a 
robust entity in the early 2010s. Capitalizing on the instability of sectarian strike in Iraq 
and the burgeoning civil war in Syria, the Islamic State expanded its caliphate to encompass 
vast swaths of Iraq and Syria, including Mosul, Iraq; however, the caliphate’s existence 
would prove ephemeral. By 2018, the Islamic State had lost much of its territory, and in 
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2019, its leader, al-Baghdadi, was killed by a U.S. strike.268 Nevertheless, the numerous 
offshoots of the Islamic State and the attractiveness of its ideology for Salafi Jihadists 
remains very much alive. 
The Islamic State’s ideology—an extreme Islamist dogma “representative of 
authentic Islam as practiced by the early generations of Muslims [that] draws on a stringent 
brand of Salafism” known as Wahabism—has maintained its salience among its affiliates 
as well as its current and former members;269 however, disagreements concerning juridic 
matters, mainly over the practice of takfir, have caused infighting among ideological 
bedfellows, often resulting in violent disagreement.  
Within the Islamic State, two periods of disagreement regarding takfir—one in 
2014 and one in 2016—were marked by infighting and the use of the Kharijite curse. The 
case surrounding the use of the Kharijite epithet in 2014 revolves around Islamic State 
member Abu Ja’far al-Hattab and the concept of takfir al-’adhir or the excommunication 
of the excuser.270 Takfir al-’adhir is a concept made prominent by ‘Umar al-Hazimi, a 
Saudi cleric, in which someone is declared an unbeliever due to their excuse of “a person’s 
unbelief or polytheism on the grounds that the person is ignorant of the fact that he or she 
is committing unbelief or polytheism.”271 Acolytes of al-Hazimi within the Islamic state, 
known as the Hazimis, were led by al-Hattab, a member of the Sharia committee in the 
Islamic State. Al-Hattaba and the Hazimis found ideological opponents of takfir al-’adhir 
in Turki al-Bin’ali and Abu Sulayman al-Shami, who denounced the practice as too 
extreme.272 Both al-Bin’ali and al-Shami authored scathing rebukes of takfir al-’adhir in 
Islamic state publications and on social media, denouncing the practice as an innovation 
and a dangerous opening to “takfir in infinite regress, or an endless chain of takfir.”273 Such 
 
268 “Timeline.” 
269 Hassan Hassan, “The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context,” n.d., 
accessed January 14, 2021. 
270 Cole Bunzel, “Ideological Infighting in the Islamic State,” Perspectives on Terrorism 13, no. 1 (2019): 14–
15. 
271 Bunzel, 1“Ideological Infighting in the Islamic State,” 4. 
272 Bunzel, 15. 
273 Bunzel, 15–17. 
78 
a practice would result in an endless cycle of declaring any and all members of the Islamic 
community as unbelievers, hampering the cause and efforts of the Islamic State and thusly 
was seen as a potentially existential challenge to the longevity of the Islamic State’s 
ideology. Al-Hattab and the Hazimis were arrested and executed in the autumn of 2014 
and declared as Kharijites by numerous committees and publications of the Islamic State, 
including the General Committee—the pre-2015 executive body of the group—and the 
Islamic State’s magazine Dabiq.274 Leaked documents from the Islamic State’s General 
Security Department indicate that the Hazimis represented “the danger of the extremists” 
and discussed the execution of the neo-Kharijites as a step to eliminating radical rebels 
within the ranks of the Islamic State.275 Though the purported Kharijites had been 
expunged from the community, the specter of the Kharijite threat persisted.  
The issue of takfir continued to divide members of the Islamic State, causing years 
of debate and official pronouncements that attempted to strike a delicate balance between 
the purported Kharijite position of “takfir in infinite regress” and the moderate Murji’ites, 
or postponers of judgment, whom generally eschewed the practice of widespread and 
consistent takfir.276 In May of 2017, the Delegated Committee released what is known as 
the Takfir Memorandum, which sought to codify the balance between the Kharijite radicals 
remaining within the Islamic State ranks who practice dissimulation and the moderates 
whom many in the Islamic State viewed as too lenient on those who violated practices 
mandated by scripture and Sharia.277 However, the backlash to the memorandum from 
moderates was swift and robust, causing the Delegated Committee to retract its 
pronouncement; however, the retraction drew the criticism of those espousing what the 
rank-and-file members of the Islamic State viewed as Kharijite in tone.278 Upon the 
memo’s retraction, numerous members of the Islamic State were arrested on suspicion of 
extremism. Notably, Abu Hafs al-Wad’ani penned a blistering letter to al-Baghdadi 
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questioning the wisdom of the Islamic State to retract the takfir memorandum and de-
emphasize the practice of takfir against those accused of unbelief.279 The letter earned al-
Wad’ani and his radical contemporaries the title of Kharijite and concomitant punishment 
for such a charge: death at the hands of the Islamic State.280  
These two episodes of perceived extremism and its subsequent excision from the 
community of the Islamic State represent a familiar impetus in invoking Kharijite imagery. 
As we saw with Nasser and the Free Officers, the declaration of groups or individuals as 
Kharijites necessitated a violent and deadly response from the state. Though many argue 
over the classification of the Islamic State as a terrorist organization, revolutionary state, 
or a spate of hybrid organization types, the use of the Kharijite epithet mirrors that 
discussed prior—its use represents the declaration of an official and religious threat to the 
community, thus requiring the threat to be exterminated. Moreover, the perceived 
extremism of the Hazimis, even by the likes of the Islamic State, which is renowned for its 
brutality and violence, demonstrates the desire of “moderate” members of the Islamic State 
to legitimize a religious and doctrinal ideology between that of the Kharijites and those 
they claim excuse the sins of Muslims, the Murji’ites. The persistent centrality of the issue 
of takfir and the threat of hidden Kharijites within the caliphate suggested by the 
introduction of the takfir memorandum and the ongoing debate concerning the subject 
indicates the continued religious and political debates that concerned not only the place of 
takfir within Islam but the political legitimacy of the organization and the acceptable 
conduct of Muslims within it. Again, this same set of political, social, and religious 
calculations dominated the state and public discourse of twentieth-century Egypt 
concerning the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime of the Free Officers; the debate 
concerning acceptable Islamist dissent as detailed by both al-Hudaybi and al-Qaradawi 
decades earlier re-emerged even within the ranks of the Islamic State. 
The governing bodies of the Islamic State and the decision-making apparatus 
functioned as al-Azhar did under Nasser; the apparatus promoted the beliefs and actions of 
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the organization’s leadership (the Free Officers in the case of al-Azhar) and religiously 
codified those labeled Kharijites as irredeemable and unpalatable. Such untenable Kharijite 
behavior thus required the state, whether the modern state of Egypt or the Islamic State, to 
exercise a form of Weberian power to eliminate those it deemed a threat to its survival and 
authority. Even for a group whose actions so closely resemble the Kharijites of antiquity 
and garner it the title of Kharijite, conflict within its ranks of the Islamic State over beliefs 
viewed as radical or Kharijite-like caused divisions that would hamper its effectiveness, 
minimize its functioning capacity as a caliphate, and hasten its demise.  
As we have seen thus far, disagreements within the Islamic State concerning 
jurisprudence and the use of the Kharijite curse bear a significant resemblance to the use 
of the Kharijite moniker in post-revolutionary Egypt and the writings of al-Qaradawi and 
al-Hudaybi; the manner in which the Kharijite imagery is invoked between rival Islamist 
factions—notably the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and al-Nusra—demonstrates only little 
deviation from the trends we have observed in the cases reviewed. Similarly, rival Islamist 
groups invoke the Kharijite narrative to gain religious and political legitimacy and 
demonize its opposition. 
Disputes between the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and other Islamist groups are often 
accompanied by religiously laden rhetoric that often invokes the master Kharijite narrative 
as well as other Islamic imagery in order to politically and religiously legitimate their 
claims as to the sole faction sufficiently Islamic in belief and practice, often referred to as 
the Victorious Sect narrative.281 As the Islamic State competed with rival Islamist factions 
contesting both the political legitimacy of the Syrian State during the Syrian Civil War and 
the religious legitimacy of opposing Islamist groups, it and its rival strategically labeled 
each other as neo-Kharijites, justifying the use of martial force against their rivals.282 The 
employment of the Kharijite narrative in this context is critical for two reasons: first, it lays 
the foundation for the Islamic State to operate as the sole religious heir to the Islamic 
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caliphate. Second, and more importantly, it attempts to legitimize its claim to political 
power over its territory in Weberian terms—as those who monopolize the use of violence 
within a given territory—and thus maximizes its ability to claim popular support and access 
to resources contested by multiple groups.283 Said differently, the use of the Islamic lexicon 
in the form of the Kharijite narrative permitted the Islamic State to delimit its claim to the 
economic, political, religious, and military hegemony it claimed over the territory it held. 
This epitomizes the multifaceted power and authority contained within the Kharijite 
narrative for those who understand its significance within Islamic culture and history; 
wielded as a curse, it forces what may previously be disparate and unconnected phenomena 
into a religiously caged discourse that is understood by its user and the audience for which 
the epithet is intended to influence. While the successful use and tangible outcomes of the 
charge of Kharijism are far more nebulous and more challenging to measure than in the 
case of Egypt, the use of the term exposes the rhetorical combatant’s self-perceived 
identity, religious and political legitimacy, and worldview. 
A similar case in which Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State declare each other 
Kharijites yields a similar outcome and analysis. The Islamic States Yemeni outgrowth 
released a documentary in 2020 entitled Absolved before Your Lord (ma’aziratan ila 
Rabbikum) in which the Islamic State details the significant differences between the two—
the caliphate, Islamic jurisprudence, alliances, sectarianism, and puritanism—and label 
members of al-Qaeda as un-believers who fail to wage war on alleged polytheists and 
heterodox Muslims. The refutation of the claim is swift and accompanied by the tried and 
true charge of Kharijism. Al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups label the Islamic state as 
modern-day neo-Kharijites who are beyond the pale of acceptable Islamic conduct.284 Such 
claims against the Islamic State appear to strike at the heart of their claim as the sole sect 
of rightly practicing Salafists; the Islamic State expends inordinate amounts of effort in 
rebutting the claim, an indication that it takes the charge seriously and sees it as a label that 
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potentially damages its image among Salafists and Muslims in general.285 This evidence 
indicates that the charge, which at times is seemingly leveled in haste, dramatically impacts 
how groups present themselves to specific audiences and demonstrates a profound 
sensitivity of Islamists to their self-identity. The Islamic state finds the charge of Kharijism 
leveled against it by other Islamists deeply troubling, indicating that it understands the 
legitimizing power of the narrative in conferring political, popular, and religious validity 
to their cause. 
D. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has attempted to outline, explain, and analyze the works of al-Hudaybi 
and al-Qaradawi and infighting among the Islamic State and rival Islamists groups where 
the charge and narrative of the Kharijites is invoked. While this survey of Islamist groups 
using the master narrative is neither complete nor all-encompassing, it best crystallizes the 
significant trends and themes that emerge when Islamists and the like invoke Kharijite 
imagery. What trends emerge from this chapter mirror those which were revealed in 
chapters II and III: the Kharijite narrative is invoked intentionally to religiously and 
politically legitimize the efforts of one Islamist group over another in both a general and 
Weberian sense; delegitimize the claim some Islamist groups make the narrative of the 
Victorious Sect; and define the boundaries of acceptable doctrine, jurisprudence, and 
behavior within the Islamic community. While these trends will be discussed more in-depth 
in the following chapter, their persistence and congruency with earlier instances in which 
the Kharijite narrative was invoked demonstrate the importance of not only the symbolism 
of the Kharijites as an anathematized group within the Islamic cultural idiom, but the power 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has explored how the epithet of Kharijite and its associated narrative 
have been and are invoked by both state and non-state actors. In investigating this 
phenomenon, this study analyzed: the origins of the Kharijite master narrative; the use of 
the narrative in modern Egypt from 1952 to the present day; and its use by prominent 
Islamist leaders and organizations from 1977 to the present day.  
When the Islamic past is made pertinent to the present, meticulously selected tropes 
are brought forward in a re-invented manner, blending the past’s well-worn orthodox 
symbology with the forces of contemporary life. As Serif Mardin wrote, “[t]he 
reproduction of Islamic societies is linked to a common use of an Islamic idiom by the 
members of such societies.”286 Through bringing this forward, modern leaders of Islamic 
civilization have combined schemes of modernization and secularization with “narratives 
of the lives and pious deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, biographies of Muslim holy men, 
poetry and love stories placed in an Islamic setting.”287 Thus, identity, and more 
pertinently, self-created identity, lays at the heart of the cyclical Kharijite discourse. Each 
of the actors explored in this thesis which has invoked the epithet of Kharijite—the Free 
Officers, al-Azhar, al-Hudaybi, al-Qaradawi, the Islamic State, and al-Qaeda—all attempt 
to reproduce some semblance of the Islamic cultural idiom by selectively recalling the 
narrative of the Kharijites, framing their existence and legitimacy squarely within an 
Islamic setting.  
Both state and non-state actors wield the curse of Kharijite and invoke the master 
narrative to legitimize their authority and power while delegitimizing opposition actors 
within an Islamic context. Notably, the Egyptian state invoked the Kharijite narrative 
against the Muslim Brotherhood to politically delegitimize the movement and consolidate 
its own political authority and monopoly on the use of violence.288 Moreover, the use of 
 
286 Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey, 3. 
287 Mardin, 5. 
288 Weber, Gerth, and Mills, From Max Weber, 78. 
84 
the Kharijite narrative by Nasser and al-Azhar promoted the Islamic legitimacy of a regime 
that in reality lacked any cogent ideology; the Islamic credentials of al-Azhar imbued the 
regime of the Free Officers with a widely understood religious, and more importantly, 
political legitimacy. In casting Nasser and the subsequent leaders of Egypt in the role of 
Ali, with the Muslim Brotherhood and Takfir wal-Hijra in the role of the Kharijites, the 
use of the Kharijite master narrative necessitated the repression of the Islamist groups, for 
their ideology and religious zeal were far too dangerous to operate within Egyptian society. 
As Ali dealt with the Kharijites, so too did Egyptian leaders dispense with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and its extremist offshoots. As the term’s use continued and popular 
understanding of the causes for violent extremism matured, however, the Kharijite 
narrative evolved into a complex and nuanced discourse.  
As the use of the Kharijite label continued after Nasser’s death, the neo-Kharijites 
were no longer seen as essentialist, eternal threats to society; rather, the failings of the state 
and society to adequately confront the social, economic, and political woes of Egyptian 
society took center stage in the discourse concerning religious extremism and political 
violence. Just as literature regarding the Kharijites of antiquity evolved to present a fairer, 
less polemical depiction of the group, so too did the contemporary discourse concerning 
political violence and religious extremism in Egypt. Rather than the Kharijites existing as 
a monolithic and overly distilled group, scholars have argued that the Kharijites of antiquity 
were motivated to act against the Caliphate by a variety of factors.  
The invocation of the Kharijite narrative reveals the scars and instability of the post-
colonial era. After centuries of colonial rule, many fledgling regimes—like the Free 
Officers of Egypt—lacked the political and social legitimacy required to govern over its 
newly formed territories. In a matter of years, regimes were challenged to meet the 
demands of an ever-modernizing world, the bi-polar political climate, and govern in a way 
that blended Western forms of governance with those indigenous to the land. Such 
competing forces and perpetual instability produced numerous political dilemmas and 
legitimacy crises for post-colonial states.  
In Egypt, this conundrum manifested itself in the form of Nasser’s hybridized 
ideology that blended tenets of Western governance with Islam, Arabism, and Africanism. 
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Egypt, and many of the authoritarian nations of the Middle East, lacked the popular 
legitimacy democratic regimes enjoyed. Thus, regimes defined by strong-man politicking 
manufactured governing ideologies, imbuing the regime with a smattering of sub-
ideologies that attempted to ameliorate the unstable conditions of the modern state. The 
Islamic cultural idiom that the Kharijite narrative belongs to is one such sub-ideology 
within the ideology of Nasserism that defined the fragile regime of the Free Officers. Said 
differently, the Free Officers used the Kharijite narrative to make up for their lack of 
legitimacy. Thus, its invocation by the current leadership of Egypt represents yet another 
phase in which the curse of Kharijite has been invoked to consolidate state power and is 
potentially indicative of the regime’s self-perceived dearth of legitimacy.  
When invoked by Islamists, the Kharijite narrative is intended to delegitimize rival 
Islamist factions and place the user of the epithet within the domain of acceptable Islamic 
behavior. When used by Islamists like al-Hudaybi and al-Qaradawi—both of whom 
accepted the construct of the international system and modern state—the Kharijite narrative 
served as a reformist shibboleth, marking members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other 
like-minded Islamists as moderates willing to work within the confines of the Egyptian 
state. Al-Hudaybi used the narrative to simultaneously marginalize the efforts of extremists 
within the Muslim Brotherhood while condemning the orthodox scholars of al-Azhar for 
promoting the secular and arguably anti-Islamist agenda of the state. For al-Qaradawi, the 
use of the Kharijite narrative served a very similar purpose. However, Qaradawi wielded 
the Kharijite narrative to identify the failings of modern Islamic society that nurtures and 
often promotes religious extremism within the community, particularly among Muslim 
youth. Both al-Hudaybi and al-Qaradawi envisioned a moderate Islamist movement that 
worked within the structure of modern states to advance their agenda; however, the 
importance of both al-Hudaybi’s and al-Qaradawi’s use of the Kharijite narrative as a 
critique and moderating force cannot be overstated. Both had been labeled as neo-
Kharijites and imprisoned by the Egyptian state as members of the Muslim Brotherhood; 
both had used the same narrative and Islamic bogeyman to bolster the position of the 
Islamist movement vis-à-vis the state. To use the narrative in such a way, as did al-Hudaybi 
and al-Qaradawi, further demonstrates the plasticity of the Kharijite narrative.  
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The Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and al-Nusra level the charge of Kharijite against rival 
Islamist factions in much the same way as the state and moderate Islamists utilized the 
term. Within the Islamic State, the charge of Kharijite was leveled against those within its 
ranks deemed too extreme concerning the doctrine of “takfir in infinite regress.”289 The 
power of this specific Islamic idiom is demonstrated by the juridical disagreements 
between members of the Islamic State in which the charge of Kharijite is leveled; for such 
a violent and extremist group to be caught in the same rhetorical debate concerning the 
brand as both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian state is noteworthy par excellence. 
This point is made that much clearer when rival radical Islamist groups level the charge 
against one another to delegitimize the opposition’s claim to the resources, recruits, and 
the mantle of the Victorious Sect.290 Not only does this link the narrative and its use across 
a range of historical agents, it illuminates the Islamic identity and narrative within which 
the actors portrays themselves acting.  
In all the cases reviewed herein, the invocation of the Kharijite label by various 
actors, in disparate times, and under distinct conditions, underscores the power of the 
Islamic cultural idiom, and more generally, the force in which ancient cultural idioms and 
ritual narratives bring to bear on contemporary events. The power and pervasiveness of the 
Kharijite narrative within the collective memory of the Islamic community represent the 
individual manifestations of a much larger and more engrained religious force. As Serif 
Mardin notes, Islam is far more than just a religion: “it structures the social life of Islamic 
societies … it provides the foundations for political obligation and that, in short … 
penetrates the smallest interstices of daily life and of social and political” phenomenon.291 
Actors recalling the Kharijite narrative invoke an indigenous, Islamic folk devil that is 
easily molded to fit the need of its user. As has been shown in this thesis, the use of the 
Kharijite narrative reveals deeper political motivations and the societal problems that are 
all too often papered-over with more easily accessible Islamic tropes. In this respect, its 
use in any context minimizes the real and tangible issues present in Islamic and global 
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society; it obscures both the foundational catalysts of religious extremism, politically 
motivated violence, as well as the actual historical group for which the epithet is named. 
By minimizing certain persons and groups to an ill-fitting, yet potent manipulation of a 
historical movement whose real origins and motivations were anything but certain, those 
who cast the Kharijite curse—Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak, and al-Sisi—minimize the 
complexity and nuance of their cause in a façade of religious lore rather than confronting 
actual realities of the contemporary world. 
Actors who invoked the Kharijite narrative—from Nasser and his Egyptian statist 
experiment to the extremists of the Islamic State—wrapped themselves in an Islamic 
cultural narrative with the aim of legitimizing their existence, fending off contenders to 
their authority, and consolidating power within the confines of their borders. This 
phenomenon resembles Weber’s definition of the modern state yet is modified with a 
religious allegory; what emerges is an Islamo-Weberian motif, one that defines the ideation 
of modern Middle Eastern states in the Islamic vernacular. The cases reviewed in this thesis 
represent the formation of the modern state with an Islamic addendum, and the 
restructuring of political and religious actors within the newly (re)formed state. Nasser and 
the Free Officers used the narrative of the Kharijites to legitimize their monopoly of the 
use of violence in midcentury Egypt; al-Hudaybi and al-Qaradawi invoked the Kharijite 
narrative to formulate an Islamist movement that fit within the construct of the modern 
state; the Islamic State—whether a recognized state or not—used the curse of the Kharijites 
to consolidate power within its ranks and against those seeking the illegitimate use of 
violence within its territory. Thus, the Kharijite narrative and its use in state formation 
represent an Islamic interpretation of the Weberian definition of a state.  
A. A WESTERN CASE OF THE KHARIJITES 
To draw a parallel to Western terms, the charge of Kharijite is akin to calling an 
individual or group “communist.” Within the liberal democratic lexicon, the charge of 
communist reflects many of the same complexities and intricacies of the Kharijite slur. The 
casting of the communist aspersion evokes a visceral response from those who receive or 
hear it; for those who bore witness to the anti-communist sentiment within U.S. culture 
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throughout the twentieth century, the meaning and gravity of the charge is undeniable. Its 
use all but eliminates any possible acquittal of the communist charge. However, like the 
Kharijite curse, a more in-depth review reveals the complexity of the charge and its internal 
and external reverberations. The communist epithet subsumes any reality of the communist 
or socialist cause; not all communists are motivated by control or are intrinsically evil. 
Rather, they reflect a variety of motivations and diverse origins. Much like the Kharijite 
curse belongs to an Islamic cultural lexicon, the communist charge belongs to an  
American cultural lexicon in which a term and concept connote a meaning, identity, or 
worse, damnation. 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis has reviewed a spectrum of literature to identify the connections 
between the contemporary and pejorative use of the Kharijite label and its origins in 
medieval Islamic heresiography and historiography. In presenting this material and 
analysis, this researcher has attempted to enrich Western audiences’ conception of the 
Kharijites, the use of the term, and its associated narrative when applied to both historical 
and contemporary events.  
An oversimplified and essentialist view of the Kharijites pervades introductory and 
intermediate scholarship. The Kharijites are often depicted as violent and intransigent 
religious extremists within textbooks and literature about Islamic history. While this 
characterization is frequently correct for the Azariqa Kharijites, it fails to recognize the 
diversity of the Kharijites; the Suffriyya and the Ibadiyya Kharijites broke from the Azariqa 
because of their extremist principles. Moreover, the only surviving sect of the Kharijites, 
the Ibadiyya, have since continued to articulate the doctrinal differences between both the 
more violent of the Kharijites and Sunni orthodoxy. In ignoring these key differences and 
oversimplifying the narrative of the Kharijites, scholars do a disservice to all students of 
Islamic history by pairing down a disparate yet historically important movement to a single 
note parable. Rather than translating the characterization of the Kharijites penned by 
medieval Islamic historiographers and heresiographers into the overstated image so often 
found in Western literature, a bit of nuance and a detailed discussion of the Kharijites, their 
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role in the founding years of Islam, and indelible impact on contemporary events, would 
go a long way to enriching Western perspectives of the group. In doing so, Middle East 
policymakers will better understand the complexity of the Kharijites and the possible 
subtext when the curse is leveled. More broadly, by consuming and understanding  
the content of this thesis, Western audiences will come to understand the authority  
and omnipresence of Islamic cultural idioms and folk devils within contemporary  
Islamic societies.  
The stickiness of religious and political tropes—like that of the Kharijites—often 
saturate our understanding of modern-day phenomena. In the cases of twentieth-century 
Egypt or the rise and fall of the Islamic state, the narrative of the Kharijites and its use as 
a curse frame the way in which we, as external, non-Muslim observers, understand the 
various elements of events as they unfold. With respect to Western policymakers, such 
framing often results in analysis, or worse, the formulation of policy, that is laden with 
incomplete assessments and injected with false narratives that ignore the reality of political, 
social, and economic forces at play. By introducing the allegorical potential of the Kharijite 
narrative and its ability to taint the layers of history, culture, and politics within the Middle 
East, this researcher has attempted to illuminate and contextualize its major reoccurrences 
within the recent past. Thus, by fully understanding the intricacies of interactions between 
Middle Eastern states and Islamist movements, interested parties are then better equipped 
with the requisite knowledge when undertaking to generate and apply policy.  
The recent history of the Middle East and the place that the Kharijite narrative 
occupies within it indicate that Middle Eastern regimes that promiscuously use the term 
are not the sole responsible parties of the neo-Kharijite phenomenon; U.S. Middle East 
policy has profound implications for the creation of religious extremists and political 
violence. As an ally to many regimes that have employed the Kharijite narrative in a 
pejorative manner, the United States must be keenly aware of the political and religious 
rhetorical battles that ensue within the borders of allied and partner states. All too often, 
U.S. security assistance, weapons sales, and economic aid are used to increase the security 
apparatus of regimes such as Egypt; that same security state is often turned against those 
citizens’ political opposition and civil disobedience. Such violent clampdowns foster the 
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environment in which radicalization, terrorism, and politically motivated violence 
commonly thrive. When Middle Eastern regimes demonize dissidents as neo-Kharijites 
and violently suppress political opposition using resources provided by the United States, 
the United States implicitly agrees to the use of the Kharijite label. If the United States fails 
to mitigate such unrestricted and unconditional security policies toward regimes who 
indiscriminately oppress their citizenry, then we are at risk of bearing the brunt of the 
Kharijite charge ourselves.  
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